Quarterly Economic Commentary, Summer 2016 by Duffy, David et al.
David Duffy 
Kieran McQuinn 
Ciara Morley
Daniel Foley
Summer 2016
Quarterly Economic 
Commentary
 
 
 
Quarterly Economic 
Commentary 
 
 
 
David Duffy 
Kieran McQuinn 
Ciara Morley 
Daniel Foley 
 
 
Summer 2016 
The forecasts in this Commentary are based on data available by 14 June 2016. 
Draft completed 14 June 2016. 
 
 
Special Articles 
 
 
 
 
 
A subscription to the Quarterly Economic Commentary costs €327 per year, 
including VAT and postage.   
Authors 
The Commentary is edited by Kieran McQuinn and David Duffy. Kieran McQuinn 
is a Research Professor, David Duffy is a Senior Research Officer, and Ciara Morley 
and Daniel Foley are Research Assistants at the Economic and Social Research 
Institute (ESRI).  
 
The Quarterly Economic Commentary has been accepted for publication by the 
Institute, which does not itself take institutional policy positions. It has been peer 
reviewed by ESRI research colleagues prior to publication. The authors are solely 
responsible for the content and the views expressed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© The Economic and Social Research Institute  
Whitaker Square, Sir John Rogerson’s Quay, Dublin 2 
 
 
 
This Open Access work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and 
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited. 
The licence may be viewed at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. 
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  S umm er  20 16 | i 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Summary Table ....................................................................................................................................... ii 
National Accounts 2015, 2016, 2017 ..................................................................................................... iii 
 
CHAPTERS 
The Irish Economy – Forecast Overview and Summary .......................................................................... 1 
The International Economy ..................................................................................................................... 3 
The Domestic Economy ........................................................................................................................ 15 
General Assessment .............................................................................................................................. 36 
 
Detailed Forecast Tables ....................................................................................................................... 42 
 
APPENDIX 
Nowcasting Appendix ........................................................................................................................... 47 
 
 
 
SPECIAL ARTICLES 
 
Cross Country Residential Investment Rates and the Implications for the Irish Housing Market ....... 51 
D. Duffy, D. Foley and K. McQuinn 
 
Corporate Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment in EU Countries:  
Policy Implications for Ireland .............................................................................................................. 75 
R.B. Davies, I. Siedschlag and Z. Studnicka 
 
  
i i  |  Q ua rt er ly  Econom ic  Comme nt ary  –  S um me r 2 01 6  
 
Summary Table 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)      
Private Consumer Expenditure -0.3 2.0 3.5 4.0 3.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 1.4 4.6 -0.8 1.0 1.0 
Investment -6.6 14.3 28.2 21.1 21.9 
Exports 2.5 12.1 13.8 8.9 7.9 
Imports 0.0 14.7 16.3 12.0 11.9 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 1.4 5.2 7.8 4.6 4.2 
Gross National Product (GNP) 4.6 6.9 5.7 4.8 4.3 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Prices (Annual Growth %) 
    
 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 0.5 0.2 -0.3 0.8 1.0 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings -0.8 1.6 2.0 2.3 2.3 
      
       
Labour Market      
Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 1,880 1,914 1,964 2,009 2,046 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 282 243 204 172 152 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 13.1 11.3 9.5 7.9 6.9 
      
       
Public Finance      
General Government Balance (€ bn) -10.2 -7.6 -4.9 -2.3 -0.2 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -5.8 -4.1 -2.3 -1.0 -0.1 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 123.2 109.7 93.6 86.4 80.2 
      
       
External Trade      
Balance of Payments Current Account (€ bn) 5.6 6.8 9.5 11.0 6.8 
Current Account (% of GNP) 3.1 3.6 4.4 4.8 2.7 
      
      
Demand      
Final Demand 0.9 9.4 11.9 8.3 8.3 
Domestic Demand -1.2 5.7 9.3 7.5 8.9 
Domestic Demand (excl. Stocks) -1.5 5.2 8.6 8.3 8.9 
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National Accounts 2015 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 89.0 92.4 3.8 0.4 3.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 27.2 27.9 2.3 3.1 -0.8 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 36.5 47.2 29.4 0.9 28.2 
Exports of Goods and Services 215.0 260.6 21.2 6.5 13.8 
Physical Changes in Stocks 1.9 2.7 
   Final Demand 369.6 430.7 16.6 4.1 11.9 
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services 180.3 215.7 19.6 2.9 16.3 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.2 -0.2    
GDP at Market Prices 189.3 215.0 13.6 5.5 7.7 
Net Factor Payments -26.2 -31.7    
GNP at Market Prices 162.9 183.1 12.4 6.4 5.7 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.4 3.4 0.0 1.0 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 70.0 73.4 3.3 4.8 
Other 68.4 88.8 20.4 29.8 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.3 -0.3 
  Statistical Discrepancy 0.2 0.2 
  Net Domestic Product 141.9 165.6 23.7 16.7
Net Factor Payments -26.2 -31.7 -5.5 21.0 
National Income 115.7 133.9 18.3 15.8 
Depreciation 29.3 30.0 0.7 2.3 
GNP at Factor Cost 145.0 163.9 18.9 13.1 
Taxes less Subsidies 17.9 19.2 1.3 7.4 
GNP at Market Prices 162.9 183.1 20.3 12.4 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 34.8 44.9 10.1 
F -26.2 -31.7 -5.5 
Net Transfers -2.7 -2.9 -0.1 
Balance on Current Account 5.9 10.4 4.5 
as % of GNP 3.6 5.7 2.4 
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National Accounts 2016 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 92.4 97.0 5.0 1.0 4.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 27.9 28.5 2.4 1.4 1.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 47.2 59.0 25.0 3.2 21.1 
Exports of Goods and Services 260.6 293.6 12.7 3.5 8.9 
Physical Changes in Stocks 2.7 1.0 
   Final Demand 430.7 479.3 11.3 2.7 8.3
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services  215.7 247.6 14.8 2.5 12.0 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.2 -0.2    
GDP at Market Prices 215.0 231.7 7.7 3.1 4.5 
Net Factor Payments  -31.7 -33.0 
   GNP at Market Prices 183.1 198.4 8.4 3.4 4.8
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.4 3.5 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 73.4 76.8 3.5 4.7 
Other 88.8 100.8 12.0 13.5 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.3 -0.3 
  Statistical Discrepancy 0.2 0.2 
  Net Domestic Product 165.6 181.2 15.6 9.4
Net Factor Payments -31.7 -33.0 -1.3 4.2 
National Income 133.9 148.2 14.2 10.6 
Depreciation 30.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 
GNP at Factor Cost 163.9 178.2 14.2 8.7 
Taxes less Subsidies 19.2 20.3 1.1 5.6 
GNP at Market Prices 183.1 198.4 15.3 8.4 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 44.9 46.1 1.2 
F -31.7 -33.0 -1.3 
Net Transfers -2.9 -2.9 0.0 
Balance on Current Account 10.4 10.2 -0.2 
as % of GNP 5.7 5.1 -0.1 
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National Accounts 2017 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 97.0 101.4 4.5 1.0 3.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 28.5 29.1 2.1 1.1 1.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 59.0 73.8 24.9 2.5 21.9 
Exports of Goods and Services 293.6 325.5 10.8 2.7 7.9 
Physical Changes in Stocks 1.0 2.0 
   Final Demand 479.3 531.8 11.0 2.4 8.3
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services  247.6 282.2 14.0 1.8 11.9 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.2 -0.2    
GDP at Market Prices 231.7 249.6 7.7 3.3 4.3 
Net Factor Payments  -33.0 -34.4 
   GNP at Market Prices 198.4 214.9 8.3 3.8 4.3
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.5 3.6 0.1 3.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 76.8 80.1 3.3 4.3 
Other 100.8 113.8 13.0 12.9 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.3 -0.3 
  Statistical Discrepancy 0.2 0.2 
  Net Domestic Product 181.2 197.6 16.4 9.0
Net Factor Payments -33.0 -34.4 -1.4 4.2 
National Income 148.2 163.2 15.0 10.1 
Depreciation 30.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 
GNP at Factor Cost 178.2 193.2 15.0 8.4 
Taxes less Subsidies 20.3 21.8 1.5 7.5 
GNP at Market Prices 198.4 214.9 16.5 8.3 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 37.5 33.2 -4.3 
F -32.0 -33.0 -1.0 
Net Transfers -2.7 -2.7 0.0 
Balance on Current Account 2.8 -2.6 -5.3 
as % of GNP 1.5 -1.3 -2.7 
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The Irish Economy - Forecast Overview and Summary 
 
Mainly due to domestic sources of growth, the Irish economy is still set to grow 
significantly in 2016. By May 2016 overall taxation receipts were up 9 per cent on 
the same time last year with income tax witnessing a 6 per cent increase over the 
same period. Between Q1 2015 and Q1 2016 total employment grew by almost 
50,000. However, the weakening contribution of net trade to economic growth is 
underscored by recent high frequency economic data suggesting that the global 
slowdown in world trade may be impacting negatively on the Irish traded sector. 
Much of this is inevitably related to the lower economic growth rates being 
experienced in the US and the UK in 2016 compared with recent years.  
 
Overall, reflecting the less than expected contribution from net trade, we have 
reduced our annual growth rates downwards marginally to 4.6 and 4.8 per cent 
respectively for GDP and GNP in 2016. Our outlook for 2017 remains unchanged 
from the Spring Commentary with output expected to grow by just over 4 per 
cent next year. 
 
The slowdown in the UK’s economic performance is compounded by the 
uncertainty engendered by the upcoming ‘Brexit’ referendum. Most independent 
assessments of the implications of Brexit suggest an adverse outcome for the UK 
economy. This would have clear implications for the Irish economy which has 
seen the domestic economy benefit significantly from the UK’s strong post-2010 
economic performance.  
 
One aspect of the economic relationship between Ireland and the UK is explored 
in a Special Article in this Commentary by Davies, Siedschlag and Studnicka 
(2016). The paper examines the attractiveness of Ireland and other EU countries 
to foreign direct investment (FDI) and finds that Ireland and the UK are perceived 
to be similar as alternative locations for FDI, in particular, by investors from 
outside the EU and in the services sector. The analysis indicates that maintaining 
cost competitiveness in the domestic economy is particularly important for 
Ireland’s attractiveness to FDI. 
 
The Programme for Government, which was published in May, addresses a 
number of key policy challenges. A significant amount of attention is devoted to 
the housing issue with commitments given to produce 25,000 new housing units 
per annum between now and 2020 with additional undertakings provided on the 
provision of social housing. A Special Article in this Commentary by Duffy, Foley 
and McQuinn (2016) examines the rate of Irish residential construction in a 
2 | Qua rt er ly  Eco no m ic  Comme nt ary  –  S um me r 2 01 6  
 
European context and argues that in the absence of significant policy initiatives it 
will be a number of years before the domestic investment rate increases so as to 
meet the number of housing units currently required in the Irish economy. In its 
recommendations the paper echoes earlier research in the Winter Commentary 
by calling for the adoption of a site tax which incentivises landowners to release 
development land at a time when it is actually demanded. 
 
The Programme for Government also calls for the presence of a vibrant banking 
sector with real competition in order to provide more choice to mortgage 
holders. It is likely however, that the recent legislation proposing to give the 
Central Bank of Ireland powers to regulate variable interest rates may act as a 
further disincentive to potential significant new entrants into the Irish market. It 
is likely that continued, and potentially greater, State involvement in the banking 
sector is acting as an impediment to increased competition being achieved. 
 
The commitment given in the Programme for Government to adhere to all 
domestic and EU fiscal rules is highly important; while there is a generally 
acknowledged need to re-invest in key public services, it is also important that 
this would take place within the parameters of the agreed fiscal space. It is also 
important that any sustained increases in government expenditure or reductions 
in taxation would not cause the domestic economy to overheat, particularly given 
the continued strong expected economic performance. 
 
Finally, in anticipation of a number of public sector pay demands, we make two 
general points about any future wage agreements which take place. The first is 
the need for any such agreements to benchmark Irish unit labour costs with those 
of key comparator European economies. As a small open economy we cannot 
afford to undermine the recent hard won competitiveness of the domestic 
economy. The second point is the fiscal sustainability of potentially trading 
reductions in personal taxation rates against significant increases in pay. Given 
the recent experiences of the Irish fiscal position, such a policy option needs to be 
considered carefully.  
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The International Economy 
 
Since the Spring Commentary there have been a number of revisions to real GDP 
growth predictions for Ireland’s main trading partners. In Spring it was forecast, 
using data from FocusEconomics, that Euro Area GDP would grow by 1.6 per cent 
in 2016 and 1.7 per cent in 2017. In the second quarter both figures have been 
revised downward, most notably the 2017 forecast. Amid growing global 
uncertainty the Euro Area is now forecast to grow by 1.5 per cent in 2016 and 1.2 
per cent in 2017. In spite of the uncertainty regarding a British exit from the 
European Union, growth forecasts for the UK in 2016 and 2017 have been revised 
upwards since the Spring Commentary. Real GDP is now anticipated to grow by 
1.9 and 2.2 per cent in 2016 and 2017 respectively. The US is expected to register 
the strongest growth of the three trading partners with a growth rate of just over 
2 per cent anticipated in each of the next two years. This is unchanged from our 
expectations in Spring.  
 
FIGURE 1 Real GDP Growth (% Change, Year-on-Year) 
  Euro Area    United States    United Kingdom 
Sources:  FocusEconomics, IMF, OECD, HM Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
 
The Euro Area Economy  
According to flash estimates from Eurostat, seasonally adjusted GDP rose by 0.6 
per cent in the Euro Area and by 0.5 per cent in the European Union during the 
first quarter of 2016 compared to the final quarter of 2015. In the fourth quarter 
of 2015, GDP grew by 0.3 and 0.4 per cent respectively. Compared to Q1 2015, 
seasonally adjusted GDP rose by 1.6 per cent in the Euro Area and by 1.7 per cent 
in the European Union in the first quarter of 2016. 
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Euro Area inflation was -0.2 per cent in April 2016, down from 0.0 per cent in 
March and compares to a rate of 0.0 per cent in April 2015. Annual inflation in 
the European Union was also -0.2 per cent in April. Compared with March 2016, 
annual inflation fell in 13 Member States, remained stable in seven and rose in 
eight. In all, negative annual rates were recorded in 17 Member States. 
 
Inflation forecasts for the Euro Area remain stubbornly low in spite of the mix of 
low or negative interest rates and quantitative easing. The European Commission 
forecast inflation of 0.2 per cent in 2016 is significantly below the European 
Central Bank’s (ECB) target of 2 per cent. In May the European Commission noted 
that high levels of public and private debt, vulnerabilities in the financial sector 
and declining competitiveness remain some of the biggest problems for the Euro 
Area. Similarly, a report published by the European Court of Auditors in April 
found that EU rules, which were tightened during the financial crisis, have not 
proved fully effective in reducing debts and encouraging reforms across the EU.1 
The Commission believes that growth and inflation will remain weak unless 
governments complement the loose monetary policy with reforms of labour and 
product markets. Of course, while structural reforms may enhance growth 
prospects as noted by McQuinn and Whelan (2015)2  they will not, in themselves, 
bring about sustained increases in European economic activity. 
 
HICP inflation in April stood at -0.2 per cent on a year-on-year basis. The 
deceleration continues to be driven by low energy prices. Consumer price 
inflation excluding energy remains positive in 2016 ranging from 0.7 per cent 
recorded in April to 1 per cent recorded in both January and March. As noted in 
previous Commentaries, despite its drag on annual inflation, lower oil prices will 
continue to support domestic consumption growth through the positive impact 
on household personal disposable income. 
 
In early June the ECB nudged up its expectations for growth and inflation in the 
Euro Area for 2016. It upgraded its Eurozone growth forecast to 1.6 per cent this 
year from the 1.4 per cent it predicted in March and maintained its forecast of 
1.7 per cent for 2017. 
 
In March the ECB cut its main interest rate from 0.05 per cent to 0 per cent in an 
attempt to further stimulate inflation across the Euro Area. The programme of 
quantitative easing also continues with a monthly bond-buying programme worth 
€80 billion. The ECB refrained from any further announcements of a stimulus 
 
                                                          
1  See www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR16_10/SR_EDP_EN.pdf. 
2  McQuinn, K. and K. Whelan (2015). ‘Europe’s Long-Term Growth Prospects: With and Without Structural Reforms’, 
ESRI Working Paper No. 501. 
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following their June meeting until the new measures have been given time to 
feed through to the real economy. As noted in the Spring Commentary the long-
term effects of these strategies need to be considered. For example, ECB bond 
purchases are distorting the market for Eurozone government debt. It is expected 
that if the ECB’s bond-buying continues at its current rate, the ECB and national 
central banks will own over 25 per cent of the entire Eurozone government bond 
market by the first half of 2017.  
 
The Euro Area seasonally adjusted unemployment rate was 10.2 per cent in 
March 2016, down from 10.4 per cent in February 2016 and from 11.2 per cent 
12 months previous. This is the lowest rate recorded in the Euro Area since 
August 2011. In the European Union the unemployment rate was 8.8 per cent in 
March 2016 down from 9.7 per cent in March 2015. Amongst the Member States, 
the lowest rates in March 2016 were recorded in the Czech Republic and 
Germany, 4.1 and 4.2 per cent respectively. Compared with a year ago, the 
unemployment rate fell in 25 Member States and increased marginally in three. 
The fall in the overall rate continues to mask continued deep problems in 
individual Member States. Greece, for example, continues to have the highest 
unemployment in the Euro Area at 24.4 per cent. Similarly, Spain, which has 
enjoyed a recovery in economic growth, continues to struggle with a stubbornly 
high unemployment rate of 20.4 per cent. 
 
The US Economy 
Real GDP increased at an annual rate of 0.8 per cent in the first quarter of 2016, 
according to the second estimate released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In 
the fourth quarter of 2015, real GDP increased by 1.4 per cent. The upward 
revision to the first quarter GDP estimate, from 0.5 per cent, reflected a surge in 
spending on home building and a steady increase in inventory investment by 
businesses. However, it remains the weakest performance since Q1 2015. 
 
Overall, the US economy continues to be squeezed by a strong Dollar, sluggish 
global demand and low oil prices. On a technical level, there are concerns that 
the model used by the US government to strip out seasonal patterns from data is 
not fully accomplishing its goals despite steps to address the problem in 2015. 
Slow first quarters followed by a rebound have been common in recent years. In 
Q1 2014, GDP was -0.9 per cent before jumping to 4.6 per cent in Q2. Similarly in 
the first quarter of 2015 GDP growth was 0.6 per cent with a jump to 3.9 per cent 
recorded in the second quarter. The ‘GNPNow’ model3 used by Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta, for example, forecasts real GDP growth in Q2 2016 of 2.9 per 
cent. 
 
                                                          
3  See www.frbatlanta.org/cqer/research/gdpnow.aspx?panel=1 for more information. 
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We noted this anomaly in the Summer Commentary in 2015 citing research from 
the Federal Reserve Banks of San Francisco and Philadelphia4 which both find 
that, even after the Bureau of Economic Analysis performs seasonal adjustment 
in producing the National Accounts, there remains residual seasonality. In spite of 
this phenomenon we continue to believe that annual growth in the US will be 2 
per cent in both 2016 and 2017. 
 
Aside from the issues with seasonality there remain concerns for US growth levels 
given recent Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) data which suggest possible soft 
economic growth in the second quarter of the year. Markit’s flash services PMI 
estimate for May fell to 51.2 from 52.8 in the previous month while the flash 
manufacturing PMI for May stood at 50.5. On the index, a reading above 50.0 
indicates expansion, below indicates contraction. Although services make up 
approximately 80 per cent of the US economy, manufacturing could act as a drag 
on second quarter growth. 
 
Total non-farm payroll employment increased marginally by 38,000 in May 
leading to a small decline of 0.3 per cent in the unemployment rate to 4.7 per 
cent. Both the unemployment rate and the number of persons unemployed had 
changed little between August 2015 and April 2016 with the US adding roughly 
200,000 new jobs per month for the past two years. These recent figures indicate 
that the US created the fewest number of jobs in more than five and a half years 
in May with the increase being the smallest gain since September 2010. Revisions 
to payroll counts from February to April have also been disappointing. 
Underscoring the weakness reported in May, employers hired 59,000 fewer 
workers in March and April than previously reported. 
 
Aside from the official employment rate, also known as the ‘U-3’ number,5 other 
metrics tend to provide a more nuanced view of employment. A broader figure is 
the U-6 rate, which is established as a more accurate portrayal of the 
employment situation. The U-6 rate is defined as all unemployed as well as 
persons marginally attached to the labour force, plus total employed part-time 
for economic reasons, as a percentage of the labour force. This means that the 
unemployed, the underemployed and the discouraged are all represented. As of 
May 2016 the U-6 rate in the US stands at 9.7 per cent, down from 10.7 per cent 
12 months previous. Despite the improvement that government statistics shows, 
 
                                                          
4  Rudebusch, G. D., D. Wilson and T. Mahedy (2015). ‘The Puzzle of Weak First-Quarter GDP Growth’, Federal Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter. 
Stark, T. (2015). ‘First Quarters in the National Income and Product Accounts’, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
Special Report.  
5  See www.bls.gov/lau/stalt.htm for more information. 
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  S umm er  20 16| 7 
 
the labour force participation rate remains sluggish with a fall 0.2 of per cent in 
May leaving the rate at 62.6 per cent. There is still no consensus on why the 
participation rate continues to fall.6  
 
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is expected to announce another 
interest rate hike in the coming months, however, there is uncertainty regarding 
whether the hike will occur sooner rather than later in the year. The Federal 
Reserve chair acknowledged that the economy is continuing to improve despite 
the weak growth reported in the first quarter. Given the economic outlook, the 
FOMC has maintained the target range for the federal funds rate at 0.25 to 0.5 
per cent. It also warned against raising interest rates too steeply as the Federal 
Reserve has limited tools to respond to another economic crisis. 
 
The UK Economy 
Gross Domestic Product in the UK is estimated, by the Office of National Statistics 
(ONS), to have increased by 0.4 per cent in Q1 2016 compared with growth of 0.6 
per cent in Q4 2015. This is the thirteenth consecutive quarter of positive growth 
since Quarter 1 2013. Between Q1 2015 and Q1 2016, GDP in volume terms 
increased by 2 per cent, revised down 0.1 per cent from the preliminary estimate. 
 
In Q4 2015 and Q1 2016, the number of people in work increased, the number of 
unemployed people was little unchanged, but the number of people not working 
and not seeking or available to work (economically inactive) fell. The current 
employment rate of 74.2 per cent is the highest since comparable records began 
in 1971. The unemployment rate was 5.1 per cent in Q1 2016, unchanged 
compared with the final quarter of 2015 but 0.5 per cent lower than a year 
earlier. Annual pay growth excluding bonuses slowed marginally to 2.1 per cent 
from 2.2 per cent in the three months through February 2016. Total pay inflation 
edged up to 2 per cent from 1.9 per cent over the same period. 
 
Labour productivity remains very sluggish in spite of the employment and 
unemployment figures. UK labour productivity as measured by output per hour 
fell by 1.2 per cent from the third to the fourth quarter of 2015 and was some 14 
per cent below an extrapolation based on its pre-downturn trend. By contrast, 
output per worker and output per job were both broadly unchanged between Q3 
and Q4 2015. On all three measures, labour productivity was about one half per 
cent higher in Q4 2015 than in the same quarter of 2014. Sluggish productivity 
levels are more of an issue on the manufacturing side of the economy. Output 
per hour in services fell by 0.7 per cent on the previous quarter but was 1.1 per 
 
                                                          
6  Williams, J.C. (2015). ‘Dancing Days Are Here Again: The Long Road Back to Maximum Employment’, Federal Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco, Economic Letter, 2015-36. 
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cent higher than Q4 2014 while output per hour in manufacturing fell by 2 per 
cent on the previous quarter and was 3.4 per cent lower than a year earlier. 
Despite some study in this area, as yet there is no consensus on the reasons 
behind this productivity puzzle.7 
 
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose by 0.3 per cent in the year to April 2016, 
down from 0.5 per cent in the year to March and far below the target set by the 
Bank of England of 2 per cent. From late 2015, the rate began to increase 
gradually from close to zero. The drop in April 2016 is the first fall since 
September 2015. Inflation has been below 1 per cent since December 2014, 
providing respite for UK households as prices rise at a slower rate than pay 
following six years of real wage falls during the financial crisis. Core inflation, 
which strips out volatile energy and food prices, was also weaker than expected 
at 1.2 per cent, down from 1.5 per cent in March. It is likely that weak inflation 
will strengthen the case for the Bank of England to keep UK interest rates at an 
all-time low of 0.5 per cent.  
 
The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) maintained a Bank Rate 
of 0.5 per cent and kept the size of the Asset Purchase Programme at £375 billion 
following their most recent meeting in May 2016. Given the likely persistence of 
the headwinds weighing on the economy, when the interest rate does increase it 
is likely that the Bank of England will do so more gradually than in recent cycles. 
The MPC clearly states that the most significant risk to their forecast is the Brexit 
referendum. A vote to leave the EU could materially alter the outlook for output 
and inflation and, therefore, the appropriate setting of monetary policy. 
 
Polls continue to show a dead heat between the leave and stay campaigns. 
YouGov note that for most of the campaign their regular polls have shown little 
movement, with normal volatility around a race that appears to be neck-and-
neck. Sterling’s value has become increasingly volatile as fears of Brexit have 
increased. The Sterling volatility index which charts the daily swings in the 
Pound’s value has risen to its highest level of volatility since the first quarter of 
2009. It is also double the level seen in April 2016 when the remain campaign 
commanded a more prominent lead in the polls. 
 
 
                                                          
7  Riley, R., C. Rosazza Bondibene and G. Young (2015). ‘The UK Productivity Puzzle 2008-2013: Evidence from British 
Businesses’, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, Discussion Paper, Number 450, 31 May 2015. 
Pessoa, J.P. and J. Van Reenan (2014). ‘The UK Productivity and Jobs Puzzle: Does the Answer Lie in Wage Flexibility?’, 
The Economic Journal, Vol. 124(576): 433-452.  
Bryson, A. and J. Forth (2015). ‘The UK’s Productivity Puzzle’,  Occasional Paper 45, Centre for Economic Performance. 
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  S umm er  20 16| 9 
 
Several studies have highlighted the negative impact that a potential Brexit could 
have on the UK, Ireland and the Euro Area. Armstrong (2016)8 and Portes (2016),9 
for example, note that, if there were to be a Brexit, shifting to a free trade 
agreement would not be a minor matter. It would be uncharted territory, likely to 
result in significant changes to the structure of the UK economy, particularly in 
respect to the tradable services sectors. Additional research from the British 
Treasury10 documents that a movement towards an alternative trade model (e.g. 
EEA or WTO) in the event of a Brexit would leave the UK permanently poorer, 
with productivity and GDP per person lower in all alternative scenarios. 
 
The World Economy 
Global growth forecasts for 2016 continue to be revised downward in light of 
increasing uncertainty and downside risks. In mid-2015, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook forecast growth in 2016 of 3.8 per 
cent. This was revised downward in their January 2016 forecast to 3.4 per cent. In 
their most recent April 2016 forecast the growth rate has been revised downward 
by a further 0.2 per cent to 3.2 per cent. The downward revision is the fourth 
straight cut in a year, putting world economic growth just marginally above last 
year’s 3.1 per cent and only 0.2 per cent above the rate the IMF has previously 
considered a technical global recession. The IMF cites the impact on emerging 
markets of China’s slowdown and weak commodity prices as the main reasons for 
the downward revisions but also acknowledges the negative impact from 
developed countries which are still struggling to escape the legacies of the 
financial crisis. 
 
The key downside risks to global growth continue to be Brexit, emerging market 
economies (EMEs) financial vulnerabilities and increased financial market 
volatility. The ECB11 states that the slowdown in EMEs has been broad-based, 
with growth in 21 of the 23 largest EMEs lower, on average, in the past three 
years than before the global financial crisis. Because EMEs play an important role 
in driving the global economy a stronger emerging market slowdown would 
therefore weigh on global and Euro Area growth. Weakness in the external 
environment together with moderating growth in China have dampened 
economic activity in EMEs as a consequence. 
 
Data in the first six months of 2016 suggest continuing challenges for the Chinese 
economy. China’s official PMI for the manufacturing sector remained unchanged 
 
                                                          
8  See http://ner.sagepub.com/content/236/1/31.full.pdf. 
9  See http://ner.sagepub.com/content/236/1/14.full.pdf. 
10  See 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/517415/treasury_analysis_economic_impa
ct_of_eu_membership_web.pdf. 
11  See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/eb201505_focus01.en.pdf. 
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at 50.1 in May – the third successive positive figure after seven months of 
contraction between August 2015 and February 2016. The PMI for the non-
manufacturing sector remains above 50.0 in May 2016 but edged down 
marginally on the April figure. With export demand continuing to slow, the 
Chinese economy reported a fall in growth to 6.7 per cent in the first quarter of 
this year, from 6.9 per cent – its lowest in 25 years – in 2015. China has a growth 
target of at least 6.5 per cent for 2016. 
 
The issues with China, EMEs, oil prices and a potential Brexit are also having an 
impact on stock market volatility globally. At the start of the year the S&P 500 
had its worst start to a year since the Great Depression. While there was a 
marginal recovery in the following couple of months there has been a return to 
volatility in more recent weeks. In January, the S&P 500 was down as much as 
11.3 per cent on the year while the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX)12 was above 32. At 
the end of May, the stock index was down only fractionally on the year-to-date 
while the VIX lay around 17, up from the 12.5 recorded in April. Underpinning the 
uncertainty in 2016 has been speculation about the pace at which the Federal 
Reserve will raise interest rates. Stock markets globally, including Germany and 
Japan, have followed a similar trend in recent months. 
 
For the first time since November 2015 the price of a barrel of oil broke through 
$50 in late May. Initial forecasts from the beginning of the year suggested that 
the price of Brent Crude oil would remain below $50 through 2016 amid a lack of 
oil supply and concern over the Chinese economy, the world’s second-biggest 
consumer of oil. A series of production outages from Canada and Nigeria in the 
past six months have helped to reduce the gap between supply and demand and, 
thus, increase the price. In early June, the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) refrained from changing its oil output policy meaning 
no new production ceiling was agreed. Brent Crude oil prices dipped slightly to 
$48.95 in response to the news. 
 
Implications for Irish Exports, Imports and the Balance of Payments 
Imports and Exports data released by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) indicate a 
slowdown in the value of goods exports and imports in recent months. Figure 2 
shows that there has been a slight dip in the value of both goods exports and 
imports in January, February and again in March. The reduction in exports in 
particular is partially a result of the relative appreciation of the Euro against 
Sterling since the start of the year as a result of increasing uncertainty regarding 
Britain’s future as a member of the European Union. 
 
                                                          
12  The CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) is a key measure of market expectations of near-term volatility conveyed by S&P 500 
stock index option prices. 
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FIGURE 2 Seasonally Adjusted Goods Exports and Imports 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Looking at data for March 2016, the seasonally adjusted value of goods exports is 
€8,571 million compared to €8,752 million a month earlier, a change of -2.0 per 
cent. There has also been a decline in seasonally adjusted goods imports, falling 
by €619 million or 12 per cent over the previous month. Seasonally adjusted 
goods exports and imports figures are also down compared to March last year by 
1.6 and 22.2 per cent respectively indicating that the global slowdown in trade 
may be beginning to impact Ireland. The resulting impact on the trade surplus 
was to increase it by €439 million or 12 per cent in the month to March 2016. 
 
Breaking down goods exports into the relevant components, we see that medical 
and pharmaceutical products account for the largest proportion of goods exports 
at approximately 25 per cent. The values of medical and pharmaceutical exports 
did, however, decrease in the year to March 2016. In particular, there was a 
decrease of €299 million or 11 per cent compared to March 2015. Other notable 
changes include exports of electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances which 
increased by €320 million or 124 per cent and exports of office machines and 
automatic data processing machines falling by €69 million or 16 per cent. Looking 
at some of the changes in goods imports reveals that imports of organic 
chemicals decreased by €100 million or 26 per cent in the year to March. There 
was also a large drop in imports of machinery specialised for particular industries, 
falling by 65 per cent or €207 million. If we exclude the volatile component 
consisting of aircraft, we get a smaller decrease of 12 per cent in goods imports 
between March 2015 and March 2016. 
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In Figure 3 we show the growth rates in the value of goods exports and imports 
for selected trading sectors. The slowdown in trade is evident from the Figure. 
While there are increases in certain sectors over the year such as exports of food 
and live animals increasing approximately 3 per cent, manufactured goods of 1.1 
per cent and beverages and tobacco of 4.7 per cent, there are significant 
reductions in the value of certain imports. The Figure highlights the volatile 
nature of certain traded sectors of the economy. For example, a large proportion 
of the 30 per cent fall in the value of imports in the machinery and transport 
equipment category can be attributed to aircraft. As well as this, the volatility of 
the pharmaceutical industry is also highlighted with a 16.6 per cent decline in the 
value of imports in the chemicals and related products category.  We also see a 
slowdown in trade if we look at high frequency indicators such as the PMI 
composite manufacturing index (Figure 4). The downward trend over the last 
number of months is evident and is another indicator that the overall growth rate 
in exports and imports may be lower in 2016 than previously thought. 
 
FIGURE 3 Export and Import Growth in Selected Trading Sectors March 2015-March 2016 (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
In 2015, the Euro depreciated against the Pound, largely driven by the ECB’s 
quantitative easing program. This gave Irish exporters a significant competitive 
advantage in the UK. More recently, the Euro has appreciated against the Pound 
driven mainly by capital outflows surrounding Brexit uncertainty. This has already 
caused a decline in trade between Ireland and the UK. More specifically, between 
April 2015 and April 2016 the value of goods exports and imports has fallen by 
approximately 8.5 and 9.4 per cent indicating that some of the implications of 
Brexit are already starting to emerge. 
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FIGURE 4  Purchasing Manufacturers Index (PMI)  
 
 
Source:  Markit. 
 
The geographical breakdown of goods imports and exports (Figure 5) shows that 
the US and the UK are still our largest trading partners. The US accounts for about 
25 per cent of our exports and approximately 14 per cent of our imports. Within 
the EU, Belgium accounts for the second largest proportion of goods exported 
largely as a result of activity in the pharmaceutical sector, which accounts for just 
over €1 billion of the €4,604 million total.  
 
FIGURE 5 Seasonally Adjusted Goods Exports and Imports March 2016 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The outlook for services trade is less clear as most recent data only cover the 
period up to the end of 2015. Balance of Payments data for Q4 2015 indicated 
robust growth in services trade in 2015, with services exports increasing 15 per 
cent year-on-year. The majority of the growth was accounted for by growth in 
computer services of 17 per cent. There was also considerably more activity in 
the financial and business services, growing by 25 and 12 per cent respectively. 
Services imports also experienced strong growth over the same period, increasing 
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by 20 per cent, largely as a result of increased activity in the royalties and licenses 
component.  
 
The biggest risk to the domestic trade outlook remains Brexit, with a largely 
negative outcome expected if the UK chooses to leave the EU. Were Brexit to 
occur, in the short run the most significant effect would be increased exchange 
rate volatility due to capital leaving the UK driven by investor uncertainty.  
 
With recent data beginning to show signs that a global slowdown in trade is 
impacting Ireland, we expect that growth in both exports and imports will be 
lower than 2015; however, we still expect both series to grow over the forecast 
period. In particular, we expect growth in exports to be 8.9 per cent in 2016 and 
to grow a further 7.9 per cent in 2017. We also envisage import growth to 
outpace export growth at 12 per cent in 2016 and 11.9 per cent in 2017 as recent 
trends in consumer lending and increases in wages are expected to fuel high 
demand for imports over the period. 
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The Domestic Economy 
 
Output 
The domestic section of the Commentary is organised as follows; we initially 
review the outlook for output growth before discussing developments in the Irish 
monetary and financial sectors. Prices and earnings in the economy are then 
discussed, followed by a review of demand-side factors such as consumption and 
housing market issues. On the supply side, we then examine developments in 
investment and the labour market before concluding with an analysis of the 
public finances. 
 
We continue to believe that output in the Irish economy will grow significantly in 
both 2016 and 2017. As noted in the Spring Commentary, over the past year 
domestic sources of growth, investment and latterly consumption, have become 
increasingly central to Irish economic performance. The significance of the traded 
sector is expected to decline somewhat with net trade contributing negatively to 
growth in both 2016 and 2017. This marks quite a reversal from the earlier stages 
of the Irish recovery where net trade was the dominant factor. 
 
High frequency data presented in the International section of the Commentary 
illustrate the degree to which the recent global slowdown in trade appears to be 
impacting on the export performance of Irish manufacturing and services firms. 
Therefore, we have modified downwards the contribution from the traded sector 
and have accordingly reduced marginally our growth forecast for 2016 to 4.6 and 
4.8 per cent for GDP and GNP respectively. We continue to believe that the 
economy will grow by just over 4 per cent in 2017. 
 
In Figure 6 we plot the annualised Nowcast and 1 quarter ahead forecast from 
the Nowcasting model since Q1 2015. This gives an indication of how the growth 
outlook for the Irish economy progressed through 2015 and into the first quarter 
of the present year. The chart suggests that, over this period, the Irish economy 
grew at its strongest rate in Q3 2015. It also suggests that, consistent with the 
high frequency trade data, the forecast outlook for the Irish economy is 
weakening albeit on a marginal basis.  
 
The extent to which the continued slowdown in global trade impacts on the Irish 
economy will be one of the most important issues to warrant scrutiny over the 
coming quarters. 
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FIGURE 6 Nowcast and 1 Quarter Ahead Forecasts (%) from the Nowcasting Model: 2015 Q1-2016 Q2 
 
 
Source:  ESRI Nowcasting model. 
 
Notwithstanding the marginal decline in the Irish outlook Ireland continues to 
register the strongest growth across Europe in 2016 (see Figure 7) based on the 
latest EU Commission outlook for Euro Area states.  
 
FIGURE 7 2016 GDP Forecast (%) For European Union Countries 
 
 
Source:  QEC forecasts (Ireland), EU Commission (the remaining). 
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Monetary and Financial Conditions 
The most recent Quarterly Financial Accounts for Q4 2015 released by the Central 
Bank shows a continuing improvement in household balance sheets. In particular, 
household debt decreased again in Q4 falling by €1.6 billion or 1.1 per cent. It 
now stands at €149.6 billion and represents a household debt per capita of 
€32,269. The fall reflects net debt repayments and debt write-downs/write-offs 
with a small positive contribution coming from reclassifications. This trend has 
emerged as a result of debt continuously declining for the last 29 quarters such 
that it now has fallen by 26.6 per cent since its peak of €203.7 billion in Q3 2008. 
The latest result marks the lowest level of household debt since Q1 2006. 
 
Indicators of household debt sustainability also continue to improve with the 
latest Central Bank release. Debt as a proportion of disposable income fell over 
the quarter, from 159.8 per cent to 155.1 percent. This reflects both a decline in 
household debt as well as strong growth in annualised disposable income. As can 
be seen in Figure 8, the overall ratio of household debt has shown a marked 
improvement over the last couple of years and has fallen by 60.2 percentage 
points since its peak of 215.3 per cent in Q2 2011.  
 
FIGURE 8 Irish Household Debt as % of GDP (2002-2015) 
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
Compared to other EU countries Ireland’s household debt position is still 
relatively poor, ranking the third highest among the EU,13 however, the 
improvement in the Irish debt position in the last year has been the most 
significant. Over the year, Irish household debt fell by 21.5 percentage points 
while countries such as Spain and Portugal experienced declines in their debt 
positions of 6.1 and 4.6 percentage points respectively. 
 
                                                          
13  The high nature of Irish debt, while reflecting the relatively younger nature of the Irish population, is mainly 
attributable to the credit-fuelled property boom between 2003 and 2007. 
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Another factor contributing to the improvement in household circumstances is 
the increase in household net worth. Over the quarter, household net worth 
increased by 1.4 per cent to €626.1 billion, or €135,078 per capita. This was 
largely driven by a rise in housing asset values as well as a decline in household 
liabilities. Comparing household net worth to the post-crisis low of €444 billion in 
Q2 2012 shows it has risen by 41 per cent since then. This is still 12.8 per cent 
lower than its pre-crisis peak of €718 billion in Q2 2007. 
 
FIGURE 9 Growth in Lending to Irish Households (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
As can be seen from Figure 9 growth rates in lending to Irish households have 
been negative for the last few years following the crisis. We do, however, see 
that the growth rates in all three categories have become less negative over the 
last year. With the latest release of the data, growth in new lending to Irish 
households for consumption purposes has become positive for the first time 
since February 2009, albeit at a modest 0.3 per cent. This growth in lending along 
with the improvement in household net worth underscores the increase in 
personal consumption we expect to see in 2016 and 2017. 
 
Total lending to Non-Financial Corporations (NFCs) declined by 5.5 per cent in 
annual terms in April. Decomposing total loans by maturity reveals a difference in 
trends between short-, medium- and long-term loans. Figure 10 shows growth in 
lending to NFCs. Short-term and long-term loans appear to still be experiencing 
negative growth as seen in the previous Commentary while medium-term loans 
of between one and five years continue their upward trend, growing in annual 
terms by 18.2 per cent in April.  
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FIGURE 10  Year-on-Year Growth Rate (%) of Lending to Irish Resident Non-Financial Corporations: January 
2007-April 2016 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
The Central Bank’s latest financial statistics release indicates that the majority of 
credit extended to NFCs is accounted for by small and medium enterprises. Given 
that many of these companies are indigenous, and given the relatively 
employment-intensive nature of these industries, increases in credit to SMEs has 
an important role to play in sustainable growth for the economy. Although the 
majority of credit is being extended to SMEs, it does not appear to be broadly 
based. In fact, the growth in credit extended to resident SMEs is negative for the 
majority of sectors. This negative annual growth in credit has been observed in 
the data since at least 2012 where nearly all sectors experienced negative growth 
rates. The latest data release shows that businesses within the information and 
communication sector, in particular, have been driving the pickup in credit over 
the last three quarters. If the pickup in credit became broader across a variety of 
sectors, we would likely see a further improvement in employment and the 
benefit to the economy would likely be much more robust and sustainable. 
 
The mortgage arrears situation continued to improve in Q4 2015, according to 
recent Central Bank data. By December 2015, there were 746,618 private 
residential mortgage accounts for principal dwelling in Ireland with a total value 
of €101.6 billion. Of these, 88,292 accounts or 11.8 per cent were in arrears, a 
reduction of 4,069 or 4.4 per cent compared to the previous quarter. Figure 11 
shows the proportion of mortgages in arrears of over 90 days and of over 180 
days. A clear downward trend can be seen in both series from 2013 onwards with 
Q4 2015 data showing 61,931 or 8.3 per cent of accounts in arrears for over 90 
days. This is the ninth consecutive quarter of decline and compares to 10.4 per 
cent in December 2014. A similar trend is observed for accounts in arrears of over 
180 days. As of December 2015, 7.4 per cent of the total was over 180 days in 
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arrears, an improvement of approximately 1.8 percentage points compared to 
this time last year. 
 
FIGURE 11 Select Mortgage Arrears Rates (%): Q3 2009-Q4 2015 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
Across a number of sectors, the Irish economy appears to experience some of the 
highest interest rates in the Euro Area. If we compare interest rates on short-
term loans against some of our European counterparts, the divergence becomes 
apparent. Across the Euro Area, interest rates charged by Irish credit institutions 
to both the household and the non-financial sector appear to be higher, on 
average, than rates charged in other countries. McQuinn and Morley (2015)14 
noted the persistence of a ‘wedge’ or significant margin between the ECB policy 
rate and the standard mortgage variable rate (SVR) charged in the domestic 
market. This followed earlier work by Goggin et al. (2012)15 which had explored 
the issue in some detail.  Newly available European cross country data16  (Figure 
12 and Figure 13) highlight the high interest rate environment experienced by 
Irish customers. 
 
                                                          
14  McQuinn K. and C. Morley (2015). ‘Standard variable rate (SVR) pass-through in the Irish mortgage market: An 
updated assessment’, QEC Research Note, June. 
15  Goggin J., S. Holton, J. Kelly, R. Lydon and K. McQuinn (2012). ‘The financial crisis and the pricing of interest rates in 
the Irish mortgage market: 2003-2011’. Central Bank of Ireland Research Technical Paper 1/RT/12. 
16  See www.euro-area-statistics.org. 
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FIGURE 12 Mortgage Interest Rates (%) on Home Loans Fixed up to 1 Year (New Business): 2012:01-2016:03 
 
 
Source:  www.euro-area-statistics.org. 
 
 
FIGURE 13 Interest Rates (%) on Loans Fixed up to 1 Year to Non-Financial Corporate (New Business): 
2012:01-2016:03 
 
 
Source:  www.euro-area-statistics.org. 
 
For both lending to households and non-financial corporates, it would appear 
that Ireland’s interest rates are comparable only to Greece’s. In both cases, Irish 
rates would appear to be significantly higher than the Euro Area average and 
that, if anything, the margin or wedge between the two is actually increasing 
through time. 
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As can be seen from Figure 12, Spain has one of the lowest mortgage variable 
interest rates in the Euro Area; however, the mortgage market in Spain also has 
one of the shortest periods of foreclosure proceedings in Europe at less than one 
year. As noted by Aiyar et al. (2015)17 weak debt enforcement raises the legal 
cost of debt restructuring and hampers banks’ ability to seize loan collateral, 
reducing the expected recovery rate on delinquent loans. This ultimately may 
feed into higher interest rates. This potential relationship between the interest 
rates charged by financial institutions and the efficiency with which they can 
work through distressed loans is important in the domestic context. 
 
Prices and Earnings 
The annual change in prices was 0 per cent in May. Some of the most notable 
changes contributing to the annual change were transport at -5.3 per cent, 
furnishings, household equipment and routine household maintenance at -3.1 
per cent and food and non-alcoholic beverages at -1.1 per cent. There were also 
increases in certain components such as miscellaneous goods and services of 5.6 
per cent as well as restaurants and hotels of 2.1 per cent. 
 
In the year to May significant upward contributions to the CPI came from 
miscellaneous goods and services at approximately 0.65 percentage points as 
well as from education of 0.1 percentage points. The largest downward 
contribution to CPI growth over the year came from transport, largely as a result 
of lower fuel prices. Figure 14 shows the annual growth in the main headings of 
the CPI.  
 
 
                                                          
17  Aiyar, S., W. Bergthaler,  J. M. Garrido, A. ILyina, A. Jobst, K. Kang, D. Kovtun, Y. Liu, D. Monaghan and M. Moretti 
(2015). ‘A strategy for resolving Europe’s problem loans’, IMF staff discussion note, September, SDN/15/19. 
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FIGURE 14  Annual Growth of Main CPI Headings May 2016 (%)  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
 
Energy prices are still exerting a significant drag on inflation. From Figure 15 we 
can see that the growth in CPI excluding energy prices has been consistently 
higher and positive for much of 2015 and 2016. 
 
Energy continues to contribute negatively (-0.89 percentage points) to the growth 
rate in inflation, as seen in Figure 14. As well as the contribution of energy, we 
can see the respective effects that mortgage interest rates are having and also 
the contribution of goods and services. We see that over the year, goods and 
services have had opposing effects on the headline rate. Goods have had an 
overwhelming negative impact on inflation in part driven by lower commodity 
prices as a result of low world demand while price growth in services was positive 
at 1.48 per cent. It is informative to decompose CPI into its relative components 
as the headline rate can mask the true evolution of prices over time. In order to 
highlight this we provide a decomposition of CPI growth into growth in goods 
prices and services prices over time.  
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FIGURE 15   Annual Growth in Inflation (%)  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Figure 16 shows the decomposition and we observe that there has been a 
diverging trend in the evolution of prices in the goods and services components 
since 2014. The goods component has been consistently negative over the period 
which is acting as a drag on inflation. At the same time there has been 
consistently strong growth in the services component. As of May 2016, the 
annual rate of growth in the goods component was -3.3 per cent while the 
comparable growth for the services component was 2.6 per cent. 
 
The annual rate of growth in the EU Harmonised Consumer Price Index (HICP) 
was also negative for year to date. Most recent data show that the growth rate 
was -0.2 per cent in May when compared to May 2015. Some notable changes 
include a fall in transport of 5.7 per cent, a fall in clothing and footwear of 1.2 per 
cent as well as increases in education of 3.8 per cent and restaurants and hotels 
of 2.2 per cent. 
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FIGURE 16  Decomposition of Annual (%) CPI Growth into Goods and Services Growth  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The latest earnings data from the CSO show a modest increase in annual Average 
Hourly Earnings of 0.7 per cent, moving from €22.25 to €22.40. There was also an 
increase of 2.3 per cent or €0.51 on a quarterly basis. Eight out of the 13 sectors 
of the economy experienced an increase in annual Average Hourly Earnings. 
Among these, the information and communication sector experienced the largest 
increase at 4.4 per cent or from €30.56 to €31.91 per hour from Q1 2015 to Q1 
2016. The largest decrease was recorded in the public administration and 
defence sector, falling by 1.3 per cent or from €25.66 to €25.33 per hour. 
 
There have also been increases in annual Average Hourly Earnings across firms of 
all sizes. Small and medium enterprises consisting of less than 50 and between 50 
and 250 employees experienced growth in annual Average Hourly Earnings of 0.2 
and 2.0 per cent respectively. Large companies of more than 250 people showed 
an increase of 0.7 per cent, moving from €25.71 to €25.89 in the year to Q1 2016. 
Wage increases were common across the private and public sector in the year to 
Q1 2016. Private sector wages increased by 1.5 per cent while the increase 
observed in the public sector was more modest at 0.4 per cent.  
 
Looking at a longer time horizon, we see that in the five years to Q1 2016 annual 
Average Hourly Earnings only increased by a modest 0.8 per cent. The gain, 
however, was quite broad occurring in ten of the 13 sectors. Again, the largest 
gains to earnings appear to have occurred in the information and communication 
sector, which encompasses many of the big international technology companies 
in Ireland. This sector saw annual Average Hourly Earnings grow from €26.93 to 
€31.91 or 18.5 per cent which is consistent with the rapid growth of many of 
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these companies. At the same time, the largest decrease occurred in the human 
health and social work sector falling from €23.56 to €22.01 or 6.6 per cent. 
 
With a tightening labour market and with close to full employment forecasted by 
the end of 2017, we expect wages to increase at an annual rate of 2.3 per cent in 
both 2016 and 2017. Although oil prices are still quite low historically, more 
recently there has been a moderate increase. This coupled with expected strong 
consumption growth boosting aggregate demand as well as strong growth in 
wages results in an expected increase in inflation of 0.8 per cent in 2016 and a 
further 1 per cent rise in 2017. 
 
TABLE 1   Inflation Measures 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 
 Annual Change 
 % % % % 
CPI 0.2 -0.3 0.8 1.0 
Personal Consumption Deflator 1.7 0.4 1.0 1.0 
HICP 0.3 0.0 0.8 1.2 
Average Hourly Earnings 1.6 2.0 2.3 2.3 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI forecasts. 
 
Demand 
Household Sector Consumption  
A range of indicators suggest that personal consumption will show strong growth 
this year. As outlined elsewhere in this Commentary, we are forecasting that the 
labour market will continue to improve. In addition, some growth in personal 
incomes, albeit moderate, is expected both this year and next.  Retail sales to 
April this year have shown strong growth when compared with the same period 
in 2015, in part reflecting strength in the motor car market. Although there has 
been some monthly volatility, the longer-term trend for the KBC Bank/ESRI 
Consumer Sentiment Index continues to point upward suggesting that confidence 
is still broadly positive.  
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FIGURE 17 KBC Bank/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index 
 
Sources: KBC/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index. 
 
As reviewed in the Monetary and Financial section, data from the Central Bank 
clearly demonstrate that, while Irish household debt is still quite high by 
European standards, overall household net worth continues to improve steadily. 
Thus, on the basis of the evidence available so far this year, we expect that 
growth in personal consumption to be 4 per cent in volume in 2016. Many of the 
factors outlined above will continue to influence personal consumption in 2017 
and so our forecast is for growth of 3.5 per cent in the volume of personal 
consumption.  
 
Property Market Developments 
The Irish property market continues to deal with the legacy of the crash, with low 
levels of supply being exceeded by demand. In the year to April, residential 
property prices at a national level were 7.1 per cent higher compared with an 
increase of 7.4 per cent in March. In Dublin property prices were 4.6 per cent 
higher on an annual basis. Outside of Dublin, residential property prices were 9.5 
per cent higher than in April 2015. Nationally, the Residential Property Price 
Index is just over 33 per cent lower than its highest level in 2007. Property prices 
in Dublin are still over 35 per cent lower than at their highest level in February 
2007, while outside Dublin, the price of residential properties is close to 36 per 
cent lower than the highest level in September 2007. The PRTB/ESRI Rent Index 
shows, for the first quarter of 2016, that rents have continued to increase, 
although the rate of growth slowed in most sectors in the first quarter. At a 
national level, monthly rent levels rose in Quarter 1 2016, up by 0.5 per cent 
when compared with the previous quarter. On an annual basis, nationally, rents 
were 8.6 per cent higher than in Quarter 1 of 2015. 
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The stock of household mortgage debt outstanding continued to decline over the 
course of the first four months of the year, to €73.7 billion in April. Compared 
with April 2015 mortgage loans were 2.3 per cent lower, with households 
repaying €1.8 billion more than was advanced in new loans.  
 
Activity levels in commercial construction remain strong, particularly in the office 
market. While estimates vary amongst the different agency firms the view is that 
the office vacancy rate has continued to decline.  There was a large increase in 
the volume of office space under construction with a resumption of office 
construction activity during 2015, although much of this supply may not begin to 
become available until 2017. 
 
Supply 
Investment 
Investment in building and construction continues to show strong growth. 
However, housing completion statistics for the first three months of the year 
suggest that residential output is unlikely to show a significant increase from 
2015. Thus, we have revised our forecast for housing completions for 2016 from 
14,500 units to 13,500 units. In contrast, the upward trend in commercial 
construction is likely to continue in 2016, with the perceived shortage of office 
space in Dublin reflected in the number of new projects being commenced. Thus, 
the total volume of investment in building and construction is forecast to increase 
by 11 per cent this year. In the expectation that we continue to see strong levels 
of commercial construction activity and that the supply of new housing begins to 
show more significant growth the volume increase in building and construction is 
projected to reach 19 per cent in 2017. 
 
In general, investment in machinery and equipment is influenced by many of the 
same factors that underpin construction investment. The rate of growth in this 
component has been influenced in recent years by aircraft purchases and the 
acquisition of intellectual property rights. With the economy expected to 
continue to grow and interest rates remaining relatively low, our expectation is 
that growth will remain strong, with the volume of investment in machinery and 
equipment forecast to increase by just under 25 per cent in 2016 and just under 
22 per cent in 2017. 
 
Labour Market 
The latest Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) from the CSO shows that 
employment increased on an annual basis by 2.4 per cent or 46,900 compared to 
Q1 2015. This brings the total level of employment to 1,976,500, still below the 
peak level of 2,169,600 reached in Q3 2008; however, given the strong 
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performance in the labour market of late, we expect total employment to reach 
two million by the end of 2016. The increase in employment in the year to Q1 
2016 mainly consisted of gains in full-time employment of 30,700 or 2.1 per cent 
as well as part-time employment of 16,300 or 3.7 per cent.  
 
The last year has been marked by modest but consistent quarterly employment 
growth. For example, in Q1 2016 employment growth on a seasonally adjusted 
basis rose by 15,400 or 0.8 per cent. In Q4 2015, employment registered growth 
of 6,600 or 0.3 per cent and the quarter before that there was growth of 9,400 or 
0.5 per cent. 
 
The data also reveal that there was a larger increase in the number of women 
being employed in the year to Q1 2016 at 27,900 or 3.2 per cent versus 19,000 or 
1.8 per cent for men. Employment growth was relatively broad, with growth 
occurring in 12 out of the 14 sectors reported. The largest increases were 
recorded in the administrative and support services activities of 6,100 or 9.9 per 
cent and the construction sector, increasing by 9,500 or 7.8 per cent. Public 
sector employment also increased over the year to Q1 2016. In particular, 
employment grew on an annual basis by 3.2 per cent or from 374,500 to 386,600 
including 4,600 census temporary staff. The only decrease observed over the 
period was seen in the defence sector which fell by 200 or 2.1 per cent. Excluding 
the temporary census field staff, a moderate increase of 0.8 per cent was 
observed in the public administration and defence sector as a whole. As it stands 
now, the overall employment rate among 15-65 year olds is 63.6 per cent 
compared to 62.2 per cent in Q1 2015.  
 
One of the best indicators of economic activity nationwide is labour market 
developments. In Table 2 we show the change in levels and also the growth in 
employment observed over the year in all regions in the country. From the Table 
we can see that employment growth over the year has occurred in all regions bar 
the West and the Mid-East. There are, however, a variety of different growth 
rates over the period with the largest growth occurring in Dublin at 26,800 or 4.6 
per cent. As well as this, there was an improvement in the level of unemployment 
across Ireland. The largest drop in unemployment levels occurred in Dublin at 
10,700. Some other notable falls in unemployment include the border, decreasing 
by 3,300 and the Mid-West where there was a decline of 3,500 persons. 
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TABLE 2 Employment Growth by Region 
Employment (000's) Q1 2015 Q1 2016 Level Change YoY 
  (% change) 
Border 190.7 195.7 5.0 2.6 
Midland 114.0 117.4 3.4 3.0 
West 177.0 176.6 -0.4 -0.2 
Dublin 584.9 611.7 26.8 4.6 
Mid-East 234.6 231.4 -3.2 -1.4 
Mid-West 148.6 153.9 5.3 3.6 
South East 201.9 204.4 2.5 1.2 
South West 277.8 285.4 7.6 2.7 
State 1929.5 1976.5 47.0 2.4 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Over the quarter to Q1 2016, the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate fell 
from 9 to 8.3 per cent as seen in Figure 18. Breaking the overall Figure into male 
and female unemployment shows that male unemployment decreased by 18,200 
or -13.4 per cent while female unemployment fell by 15,100 or -19.6 per cent in 
the year to Q1 2016. 
 
FIGURE 18 Seasonally Adjusted Quarterly Unemployment Rate (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
As mentioned in the previous Commentary, a positive trend in long-term 
unemployment has been observed over the last few years. This trend has 
continued with the latest release of the QNHS as seen in Figure 19. Over the year, 
the number of persons classified as long-term unemployed fell by 26,500 or 20.9 
per cent, bringing total long-term unemployment to 100,600. Over the same 
period, short-term unemployment fell by 11,300 or 13.7 per cent.  
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FIGURE 19 Level of Unemployment by Duration (000’s) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The crisis period clearly had a significant negative impact on Ireland’s youth 
unemployment levels. More recently, however, the level of youth unemployment 
in Ireland has begun to decrease. More specifically, the youth unemployment 
rate decreased from 21.5 to 16.9 per cent over the year to Q1 2016.  
 
Average hourly total labour costs have shown a moderate increase over the last 
year of 0.6 per cent, moving from €25.70 to €25.86. Given the importance of 
labour costs in determining unit labour costs, an important measure of 
competitiveness, it is worth looking at recent and potential future developments 
in this particular series.  
 
Irish competitiveness has improved significantly since the financial crisis. It was 
one of the main driving forces enabling an export led recovery and remains a vital 
component for securing Ireland’s continuing strong economic performance in the 
future. Ireland has benefitted from an array of external tailwinds such as the 
accommodative interest rate environment, low oil prices and beneficial exchange 
rate movements. In particular, the depreciation and relative weakness of the 
Euro to the US Dollar for most of 2013 through to 2015 greatly contributed to the 
export led growth and in turn to improvements in the labour market observed 
over that period. 
 
Ireland’s relative openness as an economy makes it particularly vulnerable to 
exogenous economic shocks. For example, the Euro has appreciated against the 
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US Dollar by around 7 per cent in recent months as a result of uncertainty 
surrounding Brexit and this has negatively impacted Irish exporters’ cost 
competiveness. This appreciation would most likely increase further if Brexit is 
realised and would have a bigger impact on sectors such as the agri-food sector 
and indigenous SMEs where Britain accounts for a large majority of exports.18 
 
To put into context the evolution of Ireland’s competitiveness over time, it is 
worth comparing Ireland’s case with some of our Euro Area counterparts. In 
particular we focus on the Harmonised Competitiveness Indicator, which is based 
on unit labour costs indices.19 This indicator allows for meaningful cross country 
comparisons and is consistent with other measures such as the real effective 
exchange rates in the Euro Area. Figure 20 shows selected Euro Area countries’ 
unit labour cost competitiveness indicators since Q1 2000.  
 
From Figure 20, it is clear that all countries, with the exception of Germany, 
experienced a loss in competitiveness from 2000 up until 2008, indicated by the 
rise in unit labour costs. The domestic competiveness indicator rose from 92.25 in 
Q1 2000 to reach a high of 131.88 in Q2 2008, meaning Ireland’s competitiveness 
position worsened by 43 per cent. From 2008 onwards, domestic competitiveness 
began to improve as unit labour costs decreased largely prompted by the 
movement away from the labour intensive construction industry.20 Since the 
peak in Q2 2008, the indicator has fallen by 38 per cent indicating a significant 
improvement in competitiveness over the last few years. Ireland is now below 
the Euro Area average and is just marginally above Germany’s level which has 
remained well below the Euro Area average for nearly the entire period in 
question. 
 
 
                                                          
18   National Competitive Council (2016). Exchange Rates and Irish Competitiveness, Competitiveness Bulletin 16-4, April. 
19  Unit labour costs for the total economy are calculated as the ratio of compensation per employee to labour 
productivity. Labour productivity is measured as GDP at constant prices divided by the total number of persons 
employed using quarterly National Accounts as published by Eurostat. 
20  O'Farrell, R. (2015). ‘Wages and Ireland’s International Competitiveness’, The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 46(3), 
p. 429-458, Sept. 2015.  
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FIGURE 20 Competitiveness Indicator (Unit Labour Costs) 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat. 
 
As unit labour costs are calculated as the ratio of total labour costs to labour 
productivity, the change in unit labour costs in Ireland can be decomposed 
respectively into these respective components. Figure 21 shows the annual 
growth rates of unit labour costs and the growth rates of total labour costs and 
labour productivity from 2000 until 2015. It is clear that the growth rate of total 
labour costs outpaced that of labour productivity in the early 2000s. This caused 
positive growth in unit labour costs up until 2008. The trend then reversed and 
the growth rate in total labour costs became negative. This was prompted by an 
increase in the growth rate in productivity and a simultaneous negative growth 
rate in labour costs from 2009 to 2013 with the exception of a marginal increase 
in 2011. As mentioned above, much of the reversal in trends in 2009 can be 
accounted for by changes in the construction sector, which resulted in many 
relatively high paying, low productivity jobs being lost. 
 
More recently, data show that productivity growth is strong while growth in total 
labour costs has been increasing at a more moderate pace since 2014. The result 
is a reduction in unit labour costs as productivity growth is outpacing growth in 
labour costs resulting in an overall improvement in competitiveness. However, 
unit labour costs could rise in the domestic economy, especially if employment in 
the construction sector were to increase significantly. As noted in the Special 
Article21 in this Commentary, maintaining cost competitiveness and future 
 
                                                          
21  Davies, R.B., I. Siedschlag and Z. Studnicka (2016). ‘Corporation Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment in EU 
Countries: Policy Implications for Ireland’, QEC Special Article, Summer 2016. 
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productivity growth are essential if the Irish economy is to remain attractive for 
FDI investment.  
 
FIGURE 21 Decomposition of Unit Labour Costs (Growth %) 
 
 
Source:  OECD database. 
 
In relation to our forecasts, we expect that net migration will be neutral this year 
with a small positive net migration figure expected in 2017. These assumptions 
along with the moderate increase we expect in the participation rate, should feed 
into an increase in the labour force and consequently employment in 2016 and 
2017. By the end of the year, we expect employment to be above two million 
with growth for the year reaching 2.3 per cent and a further 1.9 per cent in 2017. 
We also expect a further drop in the unemployment rate, reaching an annual 
average of 7.9 per cent in 2016 before falling to an average of 6.9 per cent in 
2017. 
 
Public Finances 
As described in the Spring Commentary, the performance of the Irish public 
finances in 2015 was very strong. Exchequer returns for the first five months of 
2016 show that this buoyancy has remained, reflecting the continued strength of 
domestic demand and corporate activity. Some of the strength in tax revenue 
receipts may reflect timing issues. Even allowing for some deceleration over the 
rest of the year, tax revenue growth is expected to remain strong. When 
combined with capital receipts we expect that total revenue will be over €68 
billion this year. It seems likely that expenditure levels will be close to the 
estimate for the year, with underspending by some departments funding 
overspending in some other areas. On this basis our expectation is that the 
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general government deficit will improve to -1.0 per cent in 2016. If our general 
economic forecasts prove to be correct the improvement in the public finances 
will be maintained and the deficit should improve to just -0.1 per cent of GDP in 
2017.  
 
The recently published Programme for Government makes a variety of 
commitments on the public finance fronts. It indicates that there will be a 
reduction in some taxes, an additional €4 billion spent on the existing capital 
investment programme and an overall additional expenditure of €6.75 billion by 
2021. While the programme does commit to meet all domestic and European 
fiscal rules and establish a ‘Rainy Day Fund’, it does not reconcile the overall cost 
of the various policy proposals with an estimate of the resources that will be 
available in future years to fund new tax and spending measures. This has led 
some22 to suggest that the Government should publish detailed plans 
demonstrating how the policy commitments in the programme will be funded 
within the estimated remaining fiscal space. 
 
Finally, while our forecasts suggest that the Government finances will be in 
balance in 2017, it will be particularly important to assess future activity levels in 
the Irish economy in designing optimal budgetary policy. This is especially true of 
the residential construction sector; if housing supply starts to accelerate over the 
coming year, then the economy and the labour market, in particular, may start to 
overheat. At that stage, while the public finances will be somewhat buoyant, it 
may be necessary to run a contractionary fiscal policy to prevent unsustainable 
imbalances developing in the Irish economy.  
  
 
                                                          
22  See Irish Fiscal Council (2016) Fiscal Assessment Report, June. 
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General Assessment 
 
Better than expected Exchequer taxation receipts and positive developments in 
the labour market in Q1 2016, amongst other indicators, confirm that the 
domestic economy is on course to grow robustly in 2016. However, this strong 
performance is now almost entirely a function of domestic sources of growth; a 
point reinforced by evidence suggesting that the slowdown in global trade 
apparent since the start of the year may be beginning to impact on the traded 
sector of the domestic economy. In particular, high frequency data presented in 
the International section of the Commentary illustrate that some slowdown has 
occurred over the past few months in the number of new export orders taken on 
by firms in both the manufacturing and services sector. This takes place in the 
context of a reduced growth outlook for both the US and UK economies in 2016 
compared with previous years. The relative strength of both the US and UK 
economic performance post-2010, especially when compared with the 
corresponding performance of other European economies, has been a key 
component of the Irish recovery. Therefore, we reduce our growth outlook for 
2016 for GDP and GNP marginally to 4.6 and 4.8 respectively. In 2017 we 
continue to expect growth of just over 4 per cent in both output categories. 
 
The relatively uncertain outlook for the UK economy in 2016 is compounded by 
the forthcoming referendum on the decision to leave the European Union. ESRI 
researchers have already examined the potential implications of Brexit for the 
Irish economy in a report prepared for the Department of Finance in November 
of last year23 however, given the proximity of the vote, some additional 
comments are warranted at this point. While there may be some possible 
opportunities for sections of the Irish economy in the context of a British 
withdrawal from the European Union, overall, from an Irish perspective, any 
diminishing of the economic relationship between the two countries is an 
unwelcome development. For example, any weakening of the highly integrated 
relationship between the Irish and UK labour markets could see more volatile 
outcomes over time for key Irish labour market indicators such as unemployment 
and participation rates. Additionally, a British withdrawal would almost certainly 
precipitate a lengthy period of trade negotiations concerning both the UK’s 
relationship with the EU and the rest of the world. Such uncertainty over a 
prolonged period of time would be most unwelcome for Irish exporters to the UK. 
This is particularly true for the agriculture and food processing sectors of the 
 
                                                          
23  Barrett, A., A. Bergin, J. FitzGerald, D. Lambert, D. McCoy, E. Morgenroth, I. Siedschlag and Z. Studnicka (2015). 
‘Scoping the Possible Economic Implications of Brexit on Ireland’, ESRI Research Series. 
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domestic economy. From an all-Ireland perspective, the relative importance of 
these sectors also to the Northern Ireland economy means that as a region in the 
UK, it is arguably the most vulnerable to the adverse economic implications of 
Brexit. 
 
In anticipating a future post-Brexit UK trade arrangement with the European 
Union, it is worth considering some of the conditions experienced by Switzerland 
or Norway – the only two significant European economies outside the EU. It is 
worth noting, in this regard, that among the conditions accepted by both Norway 
and Switzerland in their relationship with Europe are (a) that they abide by all EU 
single market standards and regulations (without any say in their formulation), 
(b) they must translate all relevant EU laws into their domestic legislation without 
consulting domestic voters (c) they must contribute to the EU budget and (d) 
both Norway and Switzerland must accept EU immigration resulting in a higher 
share of EU immigrants in the Swiss and Norwegian populations than in the UK.  
 
The attractiveness of Ireland and other EU countries to foreign direct investment 
is explored by Davies, Siedschlag and Studnicka (2016) in a Special Article in this 
Commentary. The paper finds that Ireland and the UK are perceived to be similar 
as alternative locations for FDI particularly by investors from outside the EU and 
for FDI in services. This result suggests that a possible redirection of FDI from the 
UK to Ireland in the case of Brexit would be more likely by investors from outside 
the EU and in the services sector. Furthermore the paper examines how changes 
in corporation tax rates in Ireland and the United Kingdom affect Ireland’s 
attractiveness to FDI. The sensitivity of Ireland’s attractiveness to changes in its 
corporate tax rate is found to be the highest with respect to FDI from outside the 
EU. A lower corporation tax in the UK is found to reduce Ireland’s attractiveness 
particularly for FDI from non-EU countries. Additional results suggest that, while a 
competitive tax rate is important to attract FDI to Ireland, it may not be sufficient 
in itself to continually attract FDI, given tax competition among European 
countries. The analysis suggests that policies which increase investment in R&D 
and maintain cost competitiveness are particularly important for Ireland’s 
attractiveness to FDI. 
 
In May, a new Government was put in place after a lengthy negotiation process 
following the general election in February. The Government, which has an 
unprecedentedly small number of seats in the Dáil, faces a number of key 
challenges. First, while there is a common acknowledgement of the need to 
replenish and reinvest in public services, which were somewhat depleted in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, this must take place within the confines of the 
agreed fiscal space. The Programme for Government commits to meeting all 
domestic and European fiscal rules but also pledges to spend at least an 
additional €6.75 billion by 2021. Any loosening of fiscal discipline at this stage 
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would pose two potential complementary risks (i) a deterioration in key fiscal 
parameters such as the debt-to-GDP ratio and the general government (GG) 
balances and (ii) cause the economy, which is growing at a significant rate, to 
potentially overheat. Our belief is that the output gap, which measures the 
degree of slack in the economy, will close in 2016. Thereafter, any increases in 
output which exceed the potential rate of growth (approximately 3.5 per cent) 
will lead to positive output gaps and ultimately overheating in the domestic 
economy.  
 
The Programme for Government also commits to delivering 25,000 new housing 
units per annum between now and 2020. There is also a renewed commitment to 
expedite the delivery of social housing units, with the pledge that 18,000 
additional housing units will be supplied by 2017, and 17,000 additional housing 
units by end 2020. Overall, however, despite a number of initiatives cited in the 
programme, it is not clear how the supply of housing will be particularly 
accelerated from its present low base. It is also worth noting that in terms of 
current developments, we have, in the present Commentary, revised downwards 
our forecast of housing units in 2016 from 14,500 units to 13,500. In that context, 
in a Special Article, Duffy, Foley and McQuinn (2016) examine the likely supply-
response of the Irish market within a European context. Duffy et al. (2014)24 
estimate a long-run fundamental rate of housing supply and we then examine the 
degree to which the actual rate converges to this fundamental rate. Duffy, Foley 
and McQuinn (2016) find that residential investment is significantly impacted by 
real GDP per capita, real house price, as well as the ratio of population aged 25-
39 to total population.  As well as this, co-integration analysis indicates that it 
takes approximately four years for residential investment to return to equilibrium 
following a shock to one of the endogenous variables. Counterfactual analysis 
conducted suggests that actual levels of investment in Ireland were far above 
levels necessary in the early 2000s and at present are somewhat below the level 
suggested by fundamentals. The paper concludes by citing the potential policy 
measures outlined in Morley, Duffy and McQuinn (2015)25 as a means of 
accelerating supply. In particular the use of a site value tax, which would provide 
an incentive for landowners to release this land for development at a time when 
it is demanded, would appear to have been effective in accelerating housing 
supply in other jurisdictions.  
 
On banking, the Programme for Government states that the overall aim of 
banking policy is to encourage more entrants and the presence of a vibrant 
banking sector with real competition in order to provide more choice to 
 
                                                          
24  Duffy, D., D. Byrne and J. FitzGerald (2014). ‘Alternative Scenarios for New Household Formation in Ireland’, Special 
Article in ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary, Spring 2014.  
25  Morley, C., D. Duffy and K. McQuinn (2015). ‘A Review of Housing Supply Policies’, Special Article in ESRI Quarterly 
Economic Commentary, Winter 2015. 
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mortgage holders. While most will agree with this aim, the continued 
involvement of the Government in the Irish banking sector may be one of the key 
impediments to credit institutions from outside the jurisdiction seeking to come 
into the Irish market. As a significant stakeholder in certain Irish credit 
institutions, the State has a particular motivation in seeing these institutions 
maximising their profit levels. Inevitably, greater competition between the 
existing institutions and from outside the market is required to ensure that Irish 
households and SMEs are not subjected to significant ‘wedges’ or margins 
between official policy and domestic interest rates. Such increased rates of 
competition would almost inevitably have adverse implications for the 
profitability of the main Irish credit institutions. Recent research (McQuinn and 
Morley, 2015)26 indicates that this wedge between domestic rates and the ECB 
policy rate is actually increasing in an Irish context and the relatively high rates 
charged in the Irish market are confirmed by Euro Area cross country data 
presented in the Commentary. Unfortunately, the recent legislation proposing to 
give the Central Bank of Ireland powers to regulate variable interest rates may act 
as a further disincentive to new competition entering the Irish market. It merely 
confirms the extent to which the different institutions of the State are intervening 
and, potentially, distorting the domestic banking market. 
 
It is likely that the new Government will face increased pressure on the public 
sector pay front. A number of public sector representative groups have signalled 
their intention to look for pay increases in the short- to medium-term. In that 
regard, a few points are worth making; the recent recovery has witnessed a 
significant increase in labour as well as (total factor) productivity, consequently 
some pay increases are warranted. However, it is crucially important that the 
Irish economy maintains its hard won competitiveness if a sustained reduction in 
unemployment and increases in employment levels are to be generated. In the 
Labour section of the Commentary, evidence on the changing relationship 
between Irish and other select Euro Area countries’ unit labour costs over the 
period 2000 to the present are presented. The improvement in competitiveness 
post-2009 and the export led growth which accompanied this was arguably one 
of the main reasons for the significant recovery in the Irish economy. Any future 
public sector pay agreements must take cognisance of such cross country 
indicators with agreed pay levels influenced by significant variations in Irish costs 
vis-à-vis key European comparator countries. This merely reflects the fact that 
Ireland is one of the most open economies in Europe (and the OECD) and is, 
accordingly, particularly sensitive to changes in relative wage levels and costs. 
Another key point regarding public sector pay negotiations is that in the past 
reductions in personal taxation rates were, at times, ‘traded off’ against 
significant increases in pay. However, the vulnerability of the Irish fiscal position 
 
                                                          
26  McQuinn, K. and C. Morley (2015). ‘Standard Variable Rate (SVR) Pass-Through in the Irish Mortgage Market: An 
Updated Assessment’, Research Note in Quarterly Economic Commentary, Summer 2015. 
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due to the sustained reduction in the taxation base in the period preceding 2007 
indicates that such a policy option needs to be carefully considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Detailed Forecast Tables 
 
 FORECAST TABLE A1 Exports of Goods and Services 
 
2014 % change in 2015 2015 % change in 2016 2016 % change in 2017 2017 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 113.3 27.0 14.8 143.8 12.8 8.5 162.3 10.3 7.6 179.0 
Tourism 3.7 18.2 6.0 4.3 4.2 3.2 4.5 5.0 4.0 4.7 
Other Services 98.1 16.8 11.2 112.5 12.8 9.5 126.9 11.8 8.5 141.8 
Exports Of Goods and Services 215.0 21.2 13.8 260.6 12.7 8.9 293.6 10.8 7.9 325.5 
FISM Adjustment 0.0 
  
0.0 
  
0.0   0.0 
Adjusted Exports 215.0 21.2 13.8 260.6 12.7 8.9 293.6 10.8 7.9 325.5 
 
 
 
 
Forecast Table A2 Investment 
 
2014 % change in 2015 2015 % change in 2016 2016 % change in 2017 2017 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Housing 3.8 13.1 7.3 4.3 21.6 11.5 5.2 38.2 41.9 7.2 
Other Building 8.0 15.6 11.0 9.2 15.4 10.4 10.6 13.9 8.9 12.1 
Transfer Costs 0.7 -2.5 1.6 0.7 26.0 20.0 0.9 20.8 15.0 1.1 
Building and Construction 12.5 13.8 9.4 14.2 17.8 11.2 16.8 21.9 19.0 20.4 
Machinery and Equipment 24.0 37.6 37.4 33.0 28.1 24.9 42.3 26.1 22.9 53.3 
Total Investment 36.5 29.4 28.2 47.2 25.0 21.1 59.0 24.9 21.9 73.8 
 
  
 FORECAST TABLE A3 Personal Income 
 
2014 % change in 2015 2015 % change in 2016 2016 % change in 2017 2017 
 
€ bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn 
Agriculture, etc 3.4 1.0 0.0 3.4 2.5 0.1 3.5 3.5 0.1 3.6 
Non-Agricultural Wages 70.0 4.8 3.3 73.4 4.7 3.5 76.8 4.3 3.3 80.1 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 19.5 30.3 5.9 25.3 18.3 4.6 30.0 16.2 4.9 34.8 
Total Income Received 92.9 10.0 9.3 102.1 8.0 8.2 110.3 7.5 8.3 118.6 
Current Transfers 23.7 0.0 0.0 23.7 -1.5 -0.4 23.4 0.0 0.0 23.4 
Gross Personal Income 116.6 7.9 9.3 125.8 6.2 7.9 133.7 6.2 8.3 142.0 
Direct Personal Taxes 27.3 6.0 1.6 28.9 4.0 1.2 30.1 3.7 1.1 31.2 
Personal Disposable Income 89.3 8.5 7.6 96.9 6.9 6.7 103.6 6.9 7.2 110.7 
Consumption 89.0 3.8 3.4 92.4 5.0 4.7 97.0 4.5 4.4 101.4 
Personal Savings 0.3 1302.1 4.2 4.5 44.9 2.0 6.5 42.1 2.8 9.3 
Savings Ratio 0.4 
  
4.7 
  
6.3   8.4 
Average Personal Tax Rate 23.3 
  
22.9 
  
22.4   21.9 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A4 Imports of Goods and Services  
 
2014 % change in 2015 2015 % change in 2016 2016 % change in 2017 2017 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 70.9 11.7 8.4 79.2 9.9 7.2 87.0 9.5 7.2 95.2 
Tourism 4.6 7.1 2.0 4.9 4.9 1.8 5.1 4.3 2.8 5.3 
Other Services 104.8 26.1 22.0 131.7 18.1 15.2 155.6 16.9 14.9 181.8 
Imports of Goods and Services 180.3 19.7 0.0 215.8 14.8 0.0 247.7 14.0 0.0 282.4 
FISM Adjustment 0.0 
  
-0.1 
  
-0.1   -0.2 
Adjusted Imports 180.3 19.6 16.3 215.7 14.8 12.0 247.6 14.0 11.9 282.2 
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FORECAST TABLE A5 Balance of Payments 
 
2014 2015 2016 2017 
 
€ bn € bn € bn € bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 215.0 260.6 293.6 325.5 
Imports of Goods and Services 180.3 215.8 247.7 282.4 
Net Factor Payments -26.2 -31.7 -33.0 -34.4 
Net Transfers -2.7 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 
Balance on Current Account 5.9 10.4 10.2 6.0 
As a % of GNP 3.6 5.7 5.2 2.8 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A6 Employment and Unemployment, Annual Average 
 
2014 2015 2016 2017 
 
000s 000s 000s 000s 
Agriculture 109.0 109.9 110.2 110.2 
Industry 348.4 373.7 383.7 391.3 
Of which: Construction 109.4 125.5 133.8 140.3 
Services 1,453.2 1,474.1 1,512.4 1,544.9 
Total at Work 1,913.8 1,963.6 2,009.0 2,046.4 
Unemployed 242.6 203.6 172.3 152.2 
Labour Force 2,156.8 2,167.2 2,181.3 2,198.5 
Unemployment Rate, % 11.3 9.5 7.9 6.9 
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Nowcasting Appendix 
 
Given the volatility observed in headline Irish macroeconomic indicators over the 
past period of time, it is essential to base the assessment of domestic economic 
activity on as broad a set of indicators as possible. In that regard, the Nowcasting 
approach1 provides a timely and accurate assessment of the underlying state of 
the economy and as such plays an important part in generating the overall 
forecasts of the Irish economy in the Commentary. 
 
TABLE 1 Current Backcast, Nowcast and Forecast of Irish Quarter-on-Quarter Growth Rates 
Period Nature of Estimate GDP Estimate % 95% Confidence Interval 
Q1 2016 Backcast 1.67 0.21 3.14 
Q2 2016 Nowcast 1.32 -0.07 2.71 
Q3 2016 Forecast 1.15 -0.29 2.60 
Source:  Own estimates (as of June 2016). 
 
On the back of the high annual growth rate recorded in 2015 the Nowcast 
estimate for Q2 2016, provided in Table 1, suggests that growth in the Irish 
economy will remain strong in the first half of 2016. Ahead of the Quarterly 
National Accounts which are due to be released in late June our Backcast also 
indicates relatively strong growth of 1.67 per cent in Q1 2016. However, as shown 
in Figure 6 in the main text, over the past year it would appear that the economy 
registered its highest rate of annual growth in Q3 2015. 
 
  
 
                                                          
1  A detailed discussion of the Nowcasting model can be found in Byrne, D., K. McQuinn and C. Morley (2014). 
‘Nowcasting and the Need for Timely Estimates of Movements in Irish Output, Research Note, 2014/3/1, Quarterly 
Economic Commentary, Autumn 2014, The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
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Cross Country Residential Investment Rates 
and the Implications for the Irish Housing 
Market 
David Duffy, Daniel Foley and Kieran McQuinn 
Introduction1 
Even by international standards, the experience of the Irish residential property 
market over the period 1995 to the present stands out. As the Irish economy 
rapidly converged to the living standards of other European countries from the 
mid-1990s onwards, activity in the property market increased dramatically. At 
that time the stock of Irish dwellings completed per 1,000 inhabitants was one of 
the lowest across Europe, therefore the combination of improving economic 
circumstance, a young population and accommodative international financing 
conditions resulted, almost inevitably, in a housing boom. 
 
This situation was complicated significantly by changes in international wholesale 
markets in the early 2000s which ultimately enhanced the ability of credit 
institutions in one Member State of the Euro Area to borrow from institutions in 
another. The significant returns apparent in the Irish property sector up to this 
point resulted in a dramatic inflow of bank funding into the domestic market 
culminating in a substantial increase in the amount of property-related lending. 
Therefore, while most of the developments in the property sector up to 
2002/2003 had been driven by improvements in fundamental variables such as 
income, interest rates and demographics, activity from then on was more a 
function of a substantial credit-fuelled bubble. Housing construction which had 
averaged 30,000 units per annum in the 1990s increased to almost 60,000 units 
in 2002 before reaching a peak of over 80,000 units per annum between 2004 
and 2007. 
 
By 2007, it was evident that house prices in the Irish market were significantly 
overvalued, driven in part by property speculation which became more frequent 
in the 2000s. Thus, with Irish financial institutions exposed to property-related 
lending, the international financial crisis of 2007/2008 had particularly calamitous 
implications for the domestic market. Over the period 2007-2012, Irish house 
 
                                                          
1  This paper was presented at a joint EU Commission/ESRI Seminar: ‘Housing Ireland's recovery: Policy perspectives’, 
Radisson Blu hotel, Golden Lane, Dublin, 6 November, 2015. 
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prices fell, in nominal terms, by 50 per cent while housing supply all but ceased 
with the number of units built per annum falling to 26,000 units in 2009 and then 
to just over 8,000 units in 2013. 
 
Given the, albeit nascent, recovery in house prices observed since early 2013, it is 
timely and pertinent to consider the potential supply response of the Irish 
residential construction sector. As of yet, this increase in house prices has not 
been accompanied by an associated increase in housing supply. This is despite 
the fact that studies such as Duffy et al. (2014) suggest that, on the basis of likely 
trends in household formation, approximately 25,000 new housing units are 
required per annum in Ireland over the medium term.  
 
In this paper we assess the future prospects for Irish residential investment. 
However, in so doing we are confronted by a number of challenges. First is the 
relatively few studies in the international literature concerned with this issue. 
Vermeulen and Rowendal (2007) and DiPasquale (1999), amongst others, 
highlight the lack of empirical studies, particularly outside of the US, on the 
supply side of the construction sector. Therefore, in examining the likely supply-
response of the Irish market we adopt an approach well established on the 
demand side of the housing market; we estimate a long-run fundamental rate of 
housing supply and we then examine the degree to which the actual rate 
converges to this fundamental rate. The fundamental rate is the rate empirically 
determined on the basis of key economic variables typically judged to influence 
the rate of housing supply.  
 
Another difficulty in addressing the Irish market is the variability in supply 
observed over the past 20 years. Therefore, it becomes difficult to ascertain a 
long-run ‘steady-state rate’ of housing supply. One way to address this issue is to 
examine the likely supply response of the Irish market in a cross-country, 
European context. This enables any long-run rate to be determined on the basis 
of a relatively wide number of housing markets, many of which were not exposed 
to the volatility seen in the Irish case.  
 
The rest of this article is structured as follows; in the next section we discuss 
recent trends in European housing investment. We then discuss the empirical 
approach adopted in the article followed by a counterfactual analysis whereby 
we determine the long-run fundamental investment rate based on our model. 
This rate is then compared with the actual rate of investment which enables us to 
determine the current rate of investment which should prevail in the Irish 
market. We then discuss the results from our models and finally conclude with 
some implications and policy recommendations. 
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Trends in European Investment 
Figure A.1 shows residential investment rates for all of the countries in our 
sample. Most countries with the exception of three appear to have a relatively 
stable rate of investment from 2003 to 2014. It is clear that Spain, Greece and 
Ireland diverge substantially from the other countries with very high rates of 
residential investment from 2003 until 2007 being followed by a substantial 
decline in 2008. This large increase in housing supply is indicative of the housing 
bubble and subsequent bust that emerged in each of these countries.  
 
The relatively high rate of investment in these countries is, in many respects, a 
function of the convergence towards the European average in living standards 
experienced by these countries from the 1990s onwards. Ireland, Spain and 
Greece had been amongst the poorest of EU Member States, and all three 
experienced a relatively late transition from agriculture, compared with the rest 
of Europe (Dellepiane et al., 2013). The convergence in each country’s living 
standard from the mid-1990s was coupled with historically low interest rates 
resulting in these countries experiencing a rapid improvement in housing 
affordability. Changes in European international finance post-2000 meant that 
the high returns from the property sectors attracted large inflows of capital into 
these countries, the bulk of which went into construction-related activities. 
Eichengreen (2006) notes that the availability of new factors of production 
(whether in the form of human capital or financial capital) may result in an 
expansion of economic activity which is not easily translated into an upgrading of 
productivity. This is more likely to result in ‘extensive’ rather than ‘intensive’ 
growth in less developed economies. Consequently it was more profitable to 
invest in construction activities over other investments such as manufacturing or 
high-tech software development, or other traded services activities.  
 
Empirical Approach 
Long-run model 
Given the highly volatile nature of the Irish housing market, we elect to estimate 
the likely residential supply response in a cross-country European context. This 
enables the estimates of our empirical approach to be as much influenced by 
markets, which have experienced relatively stable conditions, as those, such as 
Ireland’s, which are of a less stable nature. In the empirical approach, we employ 
a two-stage methodology similar to McQuinn and O’Reilly (2007), Addison-Smyth 
et al. (2008) and Gattini and Ganoulis (2012). In the first stage we estimate the 
long-run determinants of the residential investment rate using a fixed effects OLS 
model. We then proceed to model the short-run dynamics using an error-
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correction model. The long-run model is estimated on an annual basis over the 
period 2003 to 2014 covering 12 Euro Area countries.2  
 
To motivate our model and variable choice we consider both economic theory as 
well as some of the previous literature in this area. In particular we follow closely 
the methodology and variable choice set out in Gattini and Ganoulis (2012) who 
propose that residential investment depends on a set of parsimonious long-term 
fundamental variables that affect demand. As supply should equal demand in the 
long run, the investment rate depends on supply factors as well as demand 
factors. In particular, we specify the investment rate (rin) as a function of the 
following demand shifters: real house prices (rhp), GDP per capita (gdppc), the 
ratio of people in the 20 to 39 age cohort to total population (pop) and the real 
interest rate (rrat). We expect that house prices have a positive relationship with 
the investment rate. Figure A.2 (located in the Appendix) shows a simple linear 
regression of investment rates on house prices across all countries in our sample. 
It is clear that there is a positive upward sloping relationship between the two 
and this is consistent with the idea that as house prices rise, developers have 
more incentive to supply houses to the market and therefore the investment rate 
will increase.  
 
GDP per capita should also have a positive relationship with the investment rate 
as greater overall wealth in the economy increases the demand for housing and 
therefore supply. We also expect that as the levels of population at the age 
where people are most likely to buy a home increases (20-39), the investment 
rate would also increase. Finally, the real interest rate or cost of financing should 
have a negative impact as higher rates increase the cost of borrowing for 
developers and lead to a reduction in the investment rate. This variable likely 
played a role in the huge increase in the investment rates observed in Ireland, 
Spain and Greece during the early 2000s. Figure A.3 shows that the real interest 
rates in these countries were actually negative in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
which would have facilitated construction-related borrowing. 
 
More formally the long-run model of residential investment rates is expressed as 
follows: 
ln 𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 ln 𝑟ℎ𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽1ln𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽2 ln𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑖 +  �𝑟𝑖𝐷𝑖 +  ϵit12
i
 
 
The model is a fixed effects panel model with all variables log transformed apart 
from rrat and Di being the dummy for each country. Including dummy variables 
 
                                                          
2  Data obtained from the AMECO database. 
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allows us to capture any unobserved cross-country heterogeneity that is constant 
over time. We apply a Hausman test3 to motivate the use of fixed effects over a 
random effects model and the results are located in Table A.1. 
 
Results 
Our results from the long-run fixed effects model are presented in Table 1. The 
long-run relationship between the variables seems to coincide with standard 
economic theory. In particular, the investment rate is positively related to real 
house prices, income per capita and the ratio of the population in the young age 
cohort as we would expect. As all variables bar the interest rate have been log 
transformed, the coefficients represent long-run elasticities. All variables appear 
to be significant and are greater than one, indicating long-run elasticity between 
the independent and dependent variables. The results suggest, for example, that 
a one percentage point increase in house prices increases the long-run 
investment rate by 1.64 per cent. It appears that in the long run, the proportion 
of population in the 20-39 age cohort exhibits the largest effect on residential 
investment with a one percentage point increase in this population cohort 
increasing the residential investment rate in the long run by 2.86 per cent. This 
suggests demographics have an important role in determining the dynamics of 
residential investment in the Euro Area and Ireland, and is particularly relevant 
given expected demographic trends in Europe in the coming years.4 As well as 
this GDP per capita is an important determinant for the long-run investment rate 
with the coefficient being greater than one. 
 
The real interest rate variable is signed as hypothesised, negative, however, the 
variable is not significant; interest rates over the period in question were quite 
stable for the majority of countries and would not have differed significantly on a 
cross-country basis. Nonetheless, we retain the variable in our model for 
simulation purposes. In order to capture the potential differences across 
countries we include dummy variables for each of the countries in the sample. In 
particular, including these dummies ensures that our model satisfies the Gauss 
Markov assumptions and is the best linear unbiased estimator. Since our model 
includes a dummy variable for all countries, we drop the constant term from our 
regression. As a result, the individual country dummies now represent separate 
intercept terms or equivalently the expected value of the log of the residential 
investment rate when our independent variables jointly equal zero. It is clear that 
in the absence of our explanatory variables the long-run residential investment 
 
                                                          
3  See Hausman, J.A., 1978. ‘Specification Tests in Econometrics,’ Econometrica, Econometric Society, Vol. 46(6), pp. 
1251-71, November. 
4  See McQuinn K. and K. Whelan, 2015. ‘Europe's Long-Term Growth Prospects: With and Without Structural Reforms,’ 
Working Papers 201508, School of Economics, University College Dublin 
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rate for all countries rate is lower, again highlighting the relevance of these 
variables. 
 
TABLE 1 Long-run Model of Cross-country Residential Investment Rates 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Stat 
𝑙𝑛 𝑟ℎ𝑝𝑖,𝑖 𝛽0 1.64 8.56 
𝑙𝑛 𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑖 𝛽1 1.17 2.44 
𝑙𝑛 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖,𝑖 𝛽2 2.86 7.04 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑖 𝛽3 -1.24 -1.01 
    
Additional Controls    
Belgium 𝛼1 -10.57 -7.74 
Germany 𝛼2 -10.67 -7.90 
Ireland 𝛼3 -11.48 -8.28 
Greece 𝛼4 -10.34 -8.72 
Spain 𝛼5 -10.37 -8.48 
France 𝛼6 
 
-10.43 -7.77 
Italy 𝛼7 -10.52 -8.11 
Luxembourg 𝛼8 -12.59 -7.57 
The Netherlands 𝛼9 -10.92 -7.77 
Austria 𝛼10 -11.15 -8.10 
Portugal 𝛼11 -10.34 -9.05 
Finland 𝛼12 -10.49 -7.55 
        
N 
 
144 
 R2   0.81   
F-Test  
 
0.00 
  
Note:  Estimated over the period 2003 to 2014. 
 
Counterfactual Analysis 
Next we conduct our counterfactual analysis where we present the actual and 
fundamental investment rate based on our long-run model for each of the 12 
countries. The fundamental rate of investment consists of the level of investment 
that can be explained reasonably due to supply and demand factors. Our long-run 
model thus captures the dynamics of the residential investment that can be 
attributed to these factors. We can then compare the fundamental rate i.e. the 
fitted values from the model with the actual ratios observed in the data. This 
allows us to assess whether the actual investment rate is in line with what the key 
fundamental variables in the market over the period would suggest it should be. 
This kind of analysis can be useful in detecting for the presence of disequilibria in 
markets and in particular, in housing, assessing whether prices have diverged 
significantly from fundamentals. 
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As noted previously, over the period 2003-2007 there was a substantial 
difference in the actual and fundamental Irish investment rate, suggesting the 
presence of a bubble in residential construction. This is not surprising as a 
number of studies5 have examined the potential presence of disequilibrium in the 
Irish market over this period. However, what is notable from the residential 
investment results is that the bubble existed even when allowing for actual house 
price levels i.e. the fitted value used to generate the fundamental rate is based on 
actual house prices. Even with the highly elevated and ultimately unsustainable 
nature of Irish house prices, the domestic construction sector still supplied more 
housing than economic conditions suggested. Therefore, it is interesting to 
explore the implications for the residential investment rate of the acknowledged 
deviation between Irish actual and fundamental house prices during this period.  
 
There would appear to be two different experiences amongst the countries for 
the period in question (i) countries such as the Netherlands, Spain and Finland 
where developments in the residential market appeared to unfold very much in 
accordance with what key economic variables in those markets would suggest 
(Figures A.4, A.5, A.6 in Appendix) and then (ii) the remaining countries; Ireland, 
Greece, Portugal Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Austria where 
there were periods of sizeable differences between the actual and fundamental 
rate.  
 
In the cases of Ireland, Greece and Portugal there appeared to be an investment 
bubble in the period preceding the financial crisis of 2007; the actual investment 
rate was significantly higher than what key economic factors would suggest it 
should have been. This is particularly interesting in the Irish context where actual 
house prices (a key right hand side variable) were also commonly regarded6 as 
being overvalued during this period. By contrast, for the larger European 
countries, Germany, Italy and France, residential investment appeared to be 
quite subdued during the same period as the fundamental rate is quite a bit 
larger than what actually transpired in those markets. 
 
If we look closely at the results of the analysis on the Netherlands (Figure A.4), we 
can see a stark difference vis-à-vis Ireland’s results. Although we observe a 
decrease in investment rates post-2008 we find that there is very little deviation 
between fundamentals and the actual investment rate through the entire 
sample. This suggests that the residential investment rate is mainly driven by 
fundamental factors, which is in contrast to Ireland’s position. The lack of 
divergence between actual and fundamental rates of investment up to the 
 
                                                          
5  See Kelly and McQuinn (2014) for a summary of these. 
6  See Honohan (2010) for more on this. 
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present could be a result of strict land use policies in the Netherlands which limits 
the supply of new housing. As well as this, Vermeulen and Rowendal (2007) 
found that in the short run, the supply of housing in the Netherlands is nearly 
entirely inelastic making it significantly more difficult for an oversupply of housing 
to occur.  
 
Impact of Fundamental House Prices 
In the previous section the fundamental investment rate was solved for on the 
basis of the actual house price. However, we now examine the implications of 
where the model is solved for on the basis of a ‘fundamental’ house price. 
  
To arrive at a fundamental house price, we use the fitted values from a standard 
house price model, popular in the international literature. The approach, which 
can be observed in an Irish context in Addison-Smyth and McQuinn (2015) and 
Kelly and McQuinn (2014), involves inverting the demand function for housing 
and rearranging such that the dependent variable is now the price of housing as 
opposed to the quantity. Similar applications can be observed in Cameron et al.  
(2006), Muellbauer and Murphy (1997), Muellbauer and Murphy (1994), Meen 
(1996, 2000), Peek and Wilcox (1991). The model, which assumes that the 
demand for housing services is proportional to the housing stock, can be derived, 
in log linear fashion, as follows: 
 
𝑙𝑛 �
ℎ
𝑝𝑝𝑝
� =  𝑟1𝑙𝑛 � 𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝� −  𝑟2 𝑙𝑛 𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑡 + 𝑟3𝑙𝑛 𝑝𝑝𝑝 
 
where ℎ is the housing stock, 𝑝𝑝𝑝 is the population level, 𝑦 is disposable income 
and 𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑡 is the real rental rate of housing in the economy. The coefficients 𝑟1 
and 𝑟2 are the income and price elasticities of demand for housing. In 
equilibrium, the real rental rate of housing can be assumed to be equal to the 
real user cost. This can be outlined as follows: 
 
𝑝 �𝑟 −
𝑝𝑒
𝑝
� ≡ 𝑝 ×  𝑢𝑐 
 
where 𝑟 is the mortgage interest rate, 𝑝 is house prices, 𝑟 denotes expectations 
and 𝑢𝑐 is the user cost of housing. While expressions for the user cost can be 
augmented to include taxation considerations and expenditure rates of 
maintenance and repair, very often the main determinants of the expression are 
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the mortgage rate and expected house price inflation.7 Thus, solving the two 
previous equations provides the following inverted demand equation for housing: 
 
𝑙𝑛 𝑝 = 𝑟1
𝑟2
𝑙𝑛 �
𝑦
𝑝𝑝𝑝
� −
1
𝑟2
𝑙𝑛 �
ℎ
𝑝𝑝𝑝
� − 𝑙𝑛 𝑢𝑐 + 𝑟3
𝑟2
𝑙𝑛 𝑝𝑝𝑝  
 
House prices are positively related to real income per capita and population 
levels and negatively related to the per capita housing stock and the user cost of 
capital. 
 
The actual and fitted values for the house price model are shown in Figure A.16.8 
In McQuinn (2014), the results are compared with those of three other house 
price models. In general, as can be seen from McQuinn (2014), the overall result 
concerning the degree of over/undervaluation is quite similar across the models 
in question. Therefore, we are not concerned that the estimated housing market 
disequilibria are unduly model-specific.  
 
From the results of our fundamental house price model (Figure A.16), it is clear 
that actual house prices far exceeded fundamental levels in the early 2000s with 
peak divergence observed in 2006. Prices then had a precipitous decline in 2008 
leading to an extended over correction where they remain below fundamental 
levels at present. This is consistent with the housing bubble Ireland faced in the 
2000s where price levels diverged significantly from what can be considered 
sustainable levels. 
 
Using our fundamental house price model above we next substitute our 
predicted values from this into our long-run residential investment model. Doing 
this allows us to present a counterfactual scenario whereby we quantify the 
fundamental level of housing units and compare this to the actual current level 
observed. Looking at Figure 1 implies that the actual level of housing units in the 
periods 2005-2007 were far higher than the levels implied by fundamentals. This 
is again consistent with the observed housing boom and means that there was a 
large glut of housing in the market leading up to the crisis. Perhaps more 
interesting is what we observe after 2008. There was an over correction and 
housing supply was consistently below levels implied by our model. In 2014 for 
example, the model suggests we should have somewhere in the region of 16,000 
housing units being supplied where in reality there were only 11,000. Although 
 
                                                          
7  In calculating the user cost expression, Kelly and McQuinn (2014) use a variety of different house price expectations 
mechanisms, however they find that their results do not change on the basis of the different assumptions. 
8  Full regression results are available, upon request, from the authors. 
60 | Qua rt er ly  Eco no m ic  Comme nt ary  –  S um me r 2 01 6  
 
 
somewhat smaller than estimates obtained from other studies of 25,000 per 
annum,9 it is consistent with the overall notion that Ireland is simply not 
producing enough houses to meet current demand. These results have important 
implications for Ireland at the moment given the recent surge in rents (9 per cent 
over the last year)10 observed in Dublin, which seems to be driven by the 
consistent under-supply.  
 
FIGURE 1  Supply of Housing Units Actual vs. Fundamental 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own calculation.  
 
Short-Run Residential Investment Model 
Given the degree of disequilibrium observed across the different European 
countries, we also examine the extent to which actual residential investment 
rates converge back to their long-run rates. To do this we employ an error-
correction framework. It is first necessary to check for the presence of unit roots 
in the data. We then check that all variables are integrated of the same order 
before proceeding to co-integration tests. We use tests that are specifically 
designed for panel data. In particular, to test for unit roots we use both the Im, 
Pesaran, Shin test and the Harris-Tzavalis test. To test for co-integration we use 
the Kao test. Our tests conclude that the variables are non-stationary at levels 
and are co-integrated with the results presented in Table A.2. Accordingly, we 
specify the following error-correction model: 
 
 
                                                          
9  Duffy et al., 2014. Estimates based on structural demand. 
10  PRTB/ESRI Quarter 4 2015 Rent Index. Available from: www.esri.ie/pubs/RI2015Q4.pdf. 
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𝛥 𝑙𝑛 𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑖  =  𝜆(ln 𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑖−1 −  𝛽0 ln 𝑟ℎ𝑝𝑖𝑖−1 –𝛽1 ln𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖−1
− 𝛽2 ln𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖−1 −  𝛽3𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑖−1) + �𝜃𝑖Δ ln rinvit−i2
𝑖=1+  �𝜃𝑖+3Δ ln 𝑟ℎ𝑝𝑖𝑖−𝑖2
𝑖=0+  �𝜃𝑖+6Δ ln𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑖−𝑖 +2
𝑖=0
 �𝜃𝑖+9Δ ln𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖−𝑖2
𝑖=0+  �𝜃𝑖+12Δ ln 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑖−1 +  𝑢_𝑡2
𝑖=0
 
 
where the long-run rate is based on the results from the fixed effects model and 
the error-correction term can be interpreted as the residuals in time 𝑡 − 1. We 
estimate the short-run model with both OLS and fixed effects results.  
 
The results for the error-correction model are located in Table 2. We present the 
error-correction model using both long-run models, i.e. the OLS and fixed effects 
model’s lagged residuals are used to calculate the short-run error-correction 
model. In both cases, the sign of the coefficients on 𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑖−1 is negative as we 
would expect given that theory suggests that this term adjusts the dependent 
variable back towards equilibrium. The degree of error-correction is very similar 
at 29 and 24 per cent in both models. Given that this term also shows the speed 
at which adjustment takes place, this suggests that any deviation between actual 
and fundamental rates takes approximately four years to close. The results of the 
F-test indicates that the OLS specification is warranted in this case, thereby 
suggesting that country-specific factors are important in explaining cross-country 
differences in the investment rate in the long run but not in the short run. 
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TABLE 2  Short-run Cross-country Residential Investment Rate models 
Variable Parameter Estimate (OLS) T-Stat 
Estimate (Fixed 
effects ) T-Stat 
𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑖−1   𝜆0 -0.29 -3.88 -0.24 -2.94 
Δ ln 𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑖−1   𝜃1 0.42 3.46 0.31 2.28 
Δ ln 𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑖−2   𝜃2 0.25 2.01 0.15 1.05 
Δ ln 𝑟ℎ𝑝𝑖,𝑖  𝜃3 0.88 2.16 0.89 1.97 
Δ ln 𝑟ℎ𝑝𝑖,𝑖−1  𝜃4 0.28 0.72 0.39 0.95 
Δ ln 𝑟ℎ𝑝𝑖,𝑖−2   𝜃5 0.19 0.52 0.39 0.96 
Δ ln𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑖  𝜃6 0.45 1.81 0.38 1.38 
Δ ln𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑖−1  𝜃7 0.24 0.86 0.36 1.17 
Δ ln𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑖−2  𝜃8 -0.26 -1.03 -0.24 -0.91 
Δ ln𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖 ,𝑖  𝜃9 3.80 1.47 3.22 1.11 
Δ ln𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖,𝑖−1  𝜃10 -3.24 -0.92 -2.47 -0.68 
Δ ln𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖,𝑖−2  𝜃11 -2.03 -0.83 -2.25 -0.87 
Δ ln 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑖  𝜃12 0.56 0.77 0.78 1.02 
Δ ln 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑖−1  𝜃13 -1.65 -2.08 -1.51 -1.82 
Δ ln 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑖−2  𝜃14 -2.15 -2.58 -2.02 -2.33 
  
    
N   108  108 
R2   0.65  0.63 
F-Test (Fixed Effects)    0.35 
 
Note:  Estimated over the period 2003 to 2014. 
 
Conclusion 
Over the period 1995 to 2007 it is estimated that the Irish economy, as measured 
by real GDP, more than doubled in size. The unemployment rate fell from 8.5 per 
cent in Quarter 1, 1998 to 4.2 per cent in the first quarter of 2005. Apart from a 
short interruption in 2001, the Irish housing market grew significantly during this 
period. This growth is reflected not only in house prices but also in other 
indicators which show a huge expansion of activity levels within the market. Post-
2007 the housing market experience has been very different. House prices 
declined substantially by almost 50 per cent, and housing supply, which reached a 
peak of 93,000 units in 2006, fell back to approximately 10,000 levels by 2011.  
 
It is therefore of great interest to understand the mechanics behind residential 
investment. This Special Article attempts to analyse the dynamics of residential 
investment throughout selected European countries from the period 2003 to 
2014. Our empirical strategy consists of two stages whereby we measure both 
the long-run and short-run dynamics by means of a fixed effects and error-
correction model. Our analysis finds that residential investment can be well 
described by a set of fundamental factors affecting demand in the long run. We 
find a significant positive impact caused by real GDP per capita, real house price, 
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as well as the ratio of population aged 25-39 to total population. As well as this, 
co-integration analysis indicates that that there is error-correction of between 25 
and 29 per cent per year, meaning that it takes approximately four years for 
residential investment to return to equilibrium following a shock to one of the 
endogenous variables. Our counterfactual analysis suggests that actual levels of 
investment in Ireland were far above levels necessary in the early 2000s and at 
present are below the level suggested by fundamentals. Finally, in terms of 
housing units, our model implies that we are below the level that is currently 
needed at present and this has important policy implications.  
 
The housing supply problem in Ireland is very clear when one considers that as of 
1 February 2016 there were only 3,600 rental homes available on the market 
across the country.11 With rents having risen 43 per cent since the low in 2010, 
this shortage has certainly been a major factor in the observed increases. As well 
as this, there has also been a consistent shortage in housing for sale with data 
showing as of December 2015 only 25,000 homes on the market.12 Morgenroth 
(2014) notes that the need for housing in Ireland is not spread evenly throughout 
the country. He estimates that 60 per cent of the required additional housing is 
needed in Dublin with much of the rest being needed in the Dublin commuter 
belt and other large cities. Given that average total annual housing completions 
since 2011 is just over 10,000,13 this implies that the amount of house being built 
is not even enough to meet the demand for additional housing in Dublin, let 
alone the rest of the country. 
 
There are however, a variety of potential policy measures that can be undertaken 
in order to alleviate this problem. Morley et al. (2015) survey various housing 
supply measures that have been undertaken over the years in a variety of 
countries. For example, they review the use of a site or land value tax in 
Denmark. The value of this tax increases with the price of land and therefore 
provides an incentive for landowners to release development land at a time when 
it is demanded. As well as a site value tax, the authors also discuss solutions in 
relation to planning regulations such as minimum space requirements for housing 
as well as the timeframe of the planning process. While relatively successful in 
other countries, it is unclear how some of these policies would work if applied in 
Ireland. It is therefore worth conducting more research into the potential 
effectiveness of these policies in the Irish housing market.   
 
                                                          
11  Lyons, R., 2016. ‘Daft Q4 2015 Rental report’. 
12  Lyons, R., 2016. ‘Daft Q4 2015 house price report’. Available at: www.daft.ie/report/q4-2015-houseprice-report-
daft.pdf. 
13  Based on data from the Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government, Housing Statistics.  
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Appendix 
 
FIGURE A.1  Residential Investment Rates 
 
 
Source:  Ameco. 
 
 
FIGURE A.2  Correlation of House prices and Investment Rates 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations. 
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FIGURE A.3  Real Interest Rates 
 
 
Source:  Ameco. 
 
 
FIGURE A.4  Actual vs Fundamental Investment Rate the Netherlands 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations. 
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FIGURE A.5  Actual vs Fundamental Investment Rate Spain 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations. 
 
 
FIGURE A.6  Actual vs Fundamental Investment Rate Finland 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations. 
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FIGURE A.7  Actual vs. Fundamental Investment Rate Ireland  
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations. 
 
 
FIGURE A.8  Actual vs Fundamental Investment Rate Greece  
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations. 
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FIGURE A.9  Actual vs Fundamental Investment Rate Portugal  
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations. 
 
 
FIGURE A.10  Actual vs Fundamental Investment Rate Belgium 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations. 
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FIGURE A.11  Actual vs Fundamental Investment Rate Germany 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations. 
 
 
FIGURE A.12  Actual vs Fundamental Investment Rate France 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations. 
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FIGURE A.13  Actual vs Fundamental Investment Rate Italy 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations. 
 
 
FIGURE A.14  Actual vs Fundamental Investment Rate Luxembourg 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations. 
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FIGURE A.15 Actual vs Fundamental Investment Rate Austria 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations. 
 
 
FIGURE A.16  Actual vs. Fundamental House Prices Ireland 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations. 
 
  
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Actual Fundamental
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
In
de
x 
20
00
 =
 1
00
 
Actual Fundamental
74 | Qua rt er ly  Eco no m ic  Comme nt ary  –  S um me r 2 01 6  
 
 
 
TABLE A.1  Hausman Test Fixed effects vs. Random effects 
Hausman Test Statistic P-value 
Result 79.36 0.00 
 
Note:  Random effects model, H1 : Fixed effects model. 
 
 
TABLE A.2  Unit Root Test Results 
Test Type Harris-Tzavalis  Im, Pesaran, Shin  
Variable Statistic P-value Statistic P-value 
𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑣 0.963 0.148 -1.144 0.126 
𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑐 0.635 0.059 -0.511 0.305 
𝑟ℎ𝑝 0.946 0.996 -0.622 0.267 
𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑝 1.009 0.596 1.192 0.883 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑟 0.654 0.095 -1.132 0.129 
 
Note:  H0: Panel contains unit root. H1 : Panel is stationary. 
 
 
TABLE A.3  Panel Co-integration Test Results 
Kao Test Statistic P-value 
Result -5.344 0.000 
 
Note:  𝐻0: No Cointegration . 𝐻1 : Cointegration 
 
 
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  S umm er  20 16| 75 
 
Corporate Taxation and Foreign Direct 
Investment in EU Countries: Policy 
Implications for Ireland* 
Ronald B. Daviesa, Iulia Siedschlagb and Zuzanna Studnickac  
1 Introduction  
This research provides new empirical evidence on the impact of corporate 
taxation and other factors on the attractiveness of Ireland and other EU countries 
to foreign direct investment (FDI) over the period 2002-2013. In comparison to 
previous analyses which have considered individual countries as alternative 
locations,1 we analyse groups of EU countries with similar characteristics as 
alternative locations for FDI. In this context, we examine the extent to which 
Ireland and the United Kingdom (UK) are perceived as similar alternatives with 
respect to factors that determine the location choice of foreign affiliates. This 
question is relevant in relation to a possible redirection of FDI in the case of a 
vote in the UK to leave the EU. In addition to identifying average effects for all FDI 
projects, we account for the heterogeneity of investors’ behaviour by analysing 
intra-EU investments and investments from outside the EU. Furthermore, we 
identify and quantify similarities and differences with respect to the effects of 
corporate taxation and of other factors on the location choice of foreign affiliates 
in manufacturing and services.  
 
This new empirical evidence suggests how changes in the corporate taxation in 
Ireland and the UK would potentially affect Ireland’s attractiveness to foreign 
direct investment. While we focus on corporate tax policy, we also highlight the 
importance of other factors which multinationals consider for the location choice 
 
                                                          
*  This research is part of the joint ESRI and the Department of Finance Research Programme on the Macro-Economy 
and Taxation. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and they should not be regarded as an 
official position of the Department of Finance. We thank Marius Brülhart, Martina Lawless and participants at 
research presentations at the Department of Finance and the Society for International Trade Theory (SITT) 
Conference at the University College Dublin for useful discussions.  
a  University College Dublin, Oxford Centre for Business Taxation, CES-Ifӧ. ronbdavies@gmail.com. 
b  Corresponding author. Economic and Social Research Institute, Department of Economics, Trinity College Dublin. 
iulia.siedschlag@esri.ie. 
c  Economic and Social Research Institute, Department of Economics, Trinity College Dublin, KU Leuven. 
zuzanna.studnicka@esri.ie. 
1  This modelling approach implies that each location is perceived as perfectly independent from any other location 
option. Recent studies include among others Head and Mayer (2004), Devereux et al. (2007), Barrios et al. (2012), 
Lawless et al. (2014), Barrett et al. (2015), Davies and Killeen (2015).  
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of foreign affiliates including those which could be influenced by public policy 
such as production costs and investment in R&D.  
 
The results of this analysis indicate that Ireland and the UK are perceived to be 
similar as alternative locations for FDI in particular by investors from outside the 
EU and in services. This result suggests that a possible redirection of FDI from the 
UK to Ireland would be more likely in services and by investors with headquarters 
outside the EU.  
 
Consistent with international evidence, we find that on average, the 
attractiveness of countries to FDI is negatively linked to corporate tax rates. 
However, corporate investment decisions are based on a range of other factors 
which influence profitability. The results of this analysis indicate that location 
characteristics which increase the attractiveness of countries within the EU 
groups considered include market size, the possibility to access other EU markets 
from the host country, speaking the same language, being neighbours, and having 
low production costs. We uncover a non-linear effect of R&D intensity on the 
attractiveness of countries to FDI. Our results indicate that new FDI projects are 
likely to locate in countries with a low level of technological development where 
they benefit from local advantages such as low production costs. This result is 
consistent with the well-established evidence on the intensity of multinational 
firms in knowledge-based assets that give them an advantage over domestic 
firms in host countries and allow them to overcome barriers to entry in foreign 
markets.2 The non-linear effect implies that, as the R&D intensity increases above 
a certain threshold,3 countries with higher levels of technological development 
are attractive to FDI. As documented by recent evidence, knowledge-sourcing is 
an increasingly important factor for the location choice of foreign affiliates by 
multinational firms.4  
 
This analysis finds that the effect of corporate taxation on the attractiveness of 
countries to FDI varies depending on economic sectors. It appears that lower 
corporate tax rates increase the attractiveness of EU countries to FDI in services, 
while manufacturing FDI is more likely to locate in larger countries which tend to 
have higher corporate tax rates such as Germany and France.  
 
This analysis also shows that given the groups of EU countries considered, 
investors from EU and non-EU countries value location characteristics differently. 
 
                                                          
2  See for example Markusen (2002).  
3  Our estimates suggest that the turning point for R&D intensity when all new FDI projects are considered is 1.8 per 
cent of GDP.  
4  See for example von Zedtwitz and Gassmann (2002), and Iwasa and Odagiri (2004), and Siedschlag et al. (2013a). 
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While FDI by non-EU investors is more likely in countries with lower corporate tax 
rates, intra-EU investments are more likely to locate in countries with higher 
corporate taxes where they benefit from other local advantages. The results 
indicate that EU investors are seeking low cost locations in other EU countries, 
while investors from outside the EU are attracted by the possibility to get access 
to the European Single Market.  
 
Policy analysis based on these research results indicate that the sensitivity of 
Ireland’s attractiveness to FDI with respect to changes in its corporate tax rate is 
the highest among EU countries in the case of FDI projects by investors from 
outside the EU. Assuming all other factors would remain unchanged, an increase 
in Ireland’s statutory corporate tax rate by one percentage point (from 12.5 per 
cent to 13.5 per cent) would be associated with a reduction in its probability of 
being chosen as a location for FDI projects from non-EU countries by 4.6 per cent.  
 
All else being equal, a more competitive corporate tax rate in the UK would 
reduce the attractiveness of Ireland especially for FDI from non-EU countries. 
With everything else unchanged, a reduction of the UK’s statutory corporate tax 
rate by one percentage point (from 20 per cent to 19 per cent) would reduce 
Ireland’s attractiveness to new FDI projects from non-EU countries by 4.3 per 
cent.  
 
Taken together, these research results indicate that a competitive corporate tax 
rate is a significant factor for attracting FDI to Ireland, especially from countries 
outside the EU. In the context of increased international tax competition, 
Ireland’s attractiveness to FDI would benefit from policies aimed at maintaining 
cost competitiveness and enabling further R&D investment.  
 
The empirical methodology and data used for this analysis are described in 
Section 2 and the empirical results are presented in Section 3. On the basis of the 
results of this analysis, Section 4 discusses policy implications for Ireland’s 
attractiveness to FDI. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2 Empirical Methodology and Data  
Location choices by multinational firms have been typically analysed using a 
random utility maximisation econometric framework following McFadden 
(1974).5 In this modelling set-up, investors consider the set of location options 
 
                                                          
5  Recent reviews of this modelling framework include among others Schmidheiny and Brϋlhart (2011), Siedschlag et al. 
(2013a, 2013b), Lawless et al. (2014) and Davies and Killeen (2015).  
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and choose the location with the highest profitability among competing options. 
The profitability of each location option is a function of the location’s 
characteristics.  
 
2.1 Baseline Model Specification  
To identify the attractiveness of EU countries to FDI, we use a nested logit model 
following McFadden (1984). Details of this empirical approach are given in Box 1.  
 
Box 1. Modelling Location Choices by Multinational Firms: A Nested Logit Approach  
 
The nested logit model (NLM) formalised by McFadden (1984) improves on the conditional logit model (CLM) 
by considering groups of similar locations and thus allowing more flexible substitution patterns across 
alternative locations.6 The partition of location options in groups of countries (nests) is based on similar 
unobserved characteristics that affect profitability. In this empirical set-up, corporate investors make their 
location decisions in two steps:  
 (1) the choice between groups of similar locations (nests);  
 (2) the location choice  within nests. 
 
The assumption in the NLM is that of independence between nests (unobserved locational characteristics are 
not correlated between nests) while non-negative correlation of unobserved locational characteristics within 
nests is allowed.  
 
In this case, the location probability for option j located in nest k ( kjP ) is given by the product of the 
probability of nest k to be chosen among K nests ( kP ) and the probability of location j to be chosen given that 
nest k has been chosen ( kjP / ):    
     kjk
k
j PPP /*=      (1) 
An important parameter in the nested logit modelling framework is a measure of the degree of independence 
of the unobserved profit among the location options within the nest: a dissimilarity parameter, λk. A higher 
value of λk indicates a greater independence and so less correlation among location options within the nest k. If 
the location options within the nest are perfectly independent (perfectly dissimilar), λk = 1.  In this case a 
nested structure is not needed and the location probabilities could be estimated with the CLM. Low values of λk 
indicate high similarity among location options within the nest and a higher degree of substitution among 
them.  λk = 0 indicates perfect dependence (similarity) among location options.  
 
Values of λk between 0 and 1 indicate consistency of the nested structures with profit maximisation for all 
possible values of the explanatory variables. 
 
λk > 1 indicates nested structures consistent with profit maximisation behaviour for some range of the 
explanatory variables but not for all values. λk < 0 indicates that the model is inconsistent with profit 
maximisation.7 
 
 
                                                          
6  The conditional logit model is based on the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). This statistical 
property implies that changes in the location characteristics affect only the distribution of investments across all 
location options. Analyses of location choice of affiliates by multinational firms using nested logit models include 
among others Devereux and Griffith and (1998), Crozet et al. (2004) and Siedschlag et al. (2013a). 
7  More details on testing nested structures are provided by Henscher et al. (2005) and Pollak and Wales (1991).   
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In contrast to the conditional logit modelling, in the nested logit modelling, the expected total number of 
investments depends on the regressors and estimated parameters and it differs from the observed total 
number of firms. A change in a region’s locational attractiveness will affect the total number of firms summed 
across all alternative locations.8    
 
 
The baseline model specification we estimate is as follows: 





 ≠∀>
=
otherwise
kjif
y ikijij ,0
,,1 ππ
     (2) 
The dependent variable ijy  is a binary variable equal to 1 if a new foreign affiliate 
i was established in country j over the period 2002-2013. ijπ  is the expected 
profit for firm i in country j. Country j is chosen if ijπ  is larger than in any other 
location option k. Since ijπ is not known ex-ante by the multinational firm, the 
probability that country j is chosen by firm i depends on the likelihood that its 
profit will be maximised conditional on location characteristics in country j.  
 
The expected profit ijπ is a function of observed locational characteristics, jX , 
and a random term of unobserved profit ijµ :  
ijjij X µβπ +=      (3)  
 
The variable of interest in this analysis is the statutory corporate tax rate at 
country level. Corporate taxes impact on the cost of capital which in turn 
influences investment decisions. Existing evidence on the effect of corporate 
taxation on the location choice of foreign affiliates indicates that higher taxes 
reduce the likelihood of foreign direct investment.9  
 
In addition to corporate taxation, we analyse the attractiveness of Ireland and 
other EU countries to other factors which have been found to influence the 
location choice of foreign affiliates.10 These factors include:  
• demand factors such as market size and market access;  
• production costs, proxied by GDP per capita;  
 
                                                          
8  A more detailed discussion of the comparisons between the conditional and nested logit modelling frameworks is 
given by Schmidheiny and Brϋlhart (2011).  
9  Previous analyses also examined the effect of the effective average tax rates (EATR) on the location choice of FDI. 
Given the policy focus of this analysis, our empirical identification is based on the variation across countries of the 
statutory corporate tax rate which is independent of firm decisions. de Mooij and Ederveen (2003, 2008) provide 
meta-analyses of international evidence. Recent studies include Barrios et al. (2012) and Lawless et al. (2014).  
10  Recent reviews of this evidence include among others Fontagné and Mayer (2005), Siedschlag et al. (2013a, 2013b), 
and Lawless et al. (2014).  
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• technology level and innovation capacity, proxied by the private and 
public R&D expenditures as percentage of GDP;  
• trade and investment costs, proxied by the distance between the home 
and host countries; 
• cultural and geographical proximity, proxied by variables for sharing a 
common language and for sharing a common border, respectively.  
 
Definitions of the variables used in this analysis are given in Table A1 in the 
Appendix.  
 
Having tested alternative nested structures on the basis of countries’ similarity 
based on shared history, as well as institutional characteristics, we consider the 
following four groups of EU countries as location nests which are consistent with 
the tested random profit maximisation principles:11 
• United Kingdom and Ireland; 
• Core and Northern EU Group: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway;12 
• Central and Eastern EU Group: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia; 
• Southern EU Group: Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain.  
 
2.2 Heterogeneous Effects  
The above baseline model specification considers the behaviour of a 
representative location-seeking investor. However, previous analyses on the 
location choice of multinational activity in the EU (Siedschlag 2013a, 2013b) have 
found that the relevance and importance of location characteristics are perceived 
differently by investors based in the EU and investors from outside the EU, 
particularly from the US. To account for this heterogeneity of investment 
behaviour, we analyse and compare the location decisions of investors with 
headquarters in the EU and those of investors with headquarters outside the EU.  
 
 
                                                          
11  As pointed out by Greene (2000), there is no well-defined procedure to identify nested structures. Multiple nested 
structures are possible and their validity could be tested. Following McFadden (1984), values of λk between 0 and 1, 
indicate consistency of the nested structure with random profit maximisation principles for all values of the 
explanatory variables.  
12  We consider Norway as a location option together with EU countries given its membership in the European Economic 
Area (EEA) which makes it part of the European Single Market. Iceland and Lichtenstein are also members of the EEA. 
These two countries are not included in the analysis due to limited available data. The results of this analysis are 
unlikely to be affected given the very small size of these two countries.  
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Further heterogeneity in the location decisions by multinational firms is likely to 
exist across sectors of economic activity (Siedschlag 2013a, 2013b; Lawless et al. 
2014; Davies and Killeen 2015). We explore this heterogeneity by analysing 
separately the location decisions of new foreign affiliates in manufacturing and 
services.  
 
2.3 Data 
The data for this analysis include information at firm and country level from 
several sources. The firm level information is extracted from the Amadeus 
dataset provided by Bureau van Dijk. We analyse 18,100 foreign affiliates 
established in EU countries over the period 2002-2013. We consider newly 
established foreign affiliates which are directly owned by companies which report 
non-zero employment and own at least 50 per cent of the voting shares in the 
newly established enterprises.  
 
The distribution of FDI projects by host countries is shown in Table 1 while Table 
2 shows the distribution of FDI projects by country of origin. The top five FDI 
destinations (accounting for 55 per cent of all new FDI projects) are Germany, the 
UK, Romania, Italy, and the Netherlands. The top five investing countries are 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, the US, Germany and Spain (56 per cent of all new 
FDI projects). 
  
The definitions and data sources of the country level variables are given in Table 
A1 in the Appendix.  
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TABLE 1 Number of New Foreign Affiliates by Country of Destination 
Country Number of new foreign affiliates Share of new foreign affiliates 
Germany 3,333 18.40 
United Kingdom 2,434 13.44 
Romania 1,546 8.54 
Italy 1,355 7.48 
Netherlands 1,264 6.98 
France 969 5.35 
Poland 956 5.28 
Czech Republic 869 4.80 
Austria 788 4.35 
Slovakia 786 4.34 
Spain 667 3.68 
Portugal 462 2.55 
Belgium 346 1.91 
Ireland 321 1.77 
Denmark 308 1.70 
Finland 260 1.44 
Norway 250 1.38 
Hungary 234 1.29 
Estonia 194 1.07 
Croatia 191 1.05 
Latvia 173 0.96 
Luxembourg 134 0.74 
Bulgaria 94 0.52 
Slovenia 56 0.31 
Greece 44 0.24 
Malta 44 0.24 
Lithuania 32 0.18 
Total 18,110 100.00 
 
Source:  Amadeus dataset provided by Bureau van Dijk. 
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TABLE 2 Number of New Foreign Affiliates by Country of Origin 
Origin Number of new foreign affiliates 
Share in total 
new FDI projects Origin 
Number of new 
foreign 
affiliates 
Share in total 
new FDI projects 
Switzerland 3,209 17.72 Cayman Islands 22 0.12 
Netherlands 2,274 12.56 Croatia 20 0.11 
United States 1,895 10.46 Malta 18 0.10 
Germany  1,712 9.45 Romania 17 0.09 
Spain  1,087 6.00 Virgin Islands, British 14 0.08 
Sweden 995 5.49 Chile 9 0.05 
Italy 932 5.15 Bosnia and Herzegovina 8 0.04 
Belgium 707 3.90 Bangladesh 7 0.04 
United Kingdom 614 3.39 Mexico 7 0.04 
Japan 482 2.66 Russia 7 0.04 
Austria 451 2.49 Argentina 6 0.03 
France 423 2.34 Egypt 5 0.03 
Denmark 381 2.10 Indonesia 5 0.03 
Czech Republic 363 2.00 Moldova 5 0.03 
Hungary 291 1.61 Taiwan 5 0.03 
Finland 285 1.57 Venezuela 5 0.03 
Slovak Republic 182 1.00 Andorra 4 0.02 
Portugal 167 0.92 Sri Lanka 4 0.02 
Ireland 165 0.91 Nigeria 4 0.02 
Luxembourg 112 0.62 Gibraltar 3 0.02 
Israel 93 0.51 Pakistan 3 0.02 
Turkey 93 0.51 Saudi Arabia 3 0.02 
Norway 90 0.50 Angola 2 0.01 
Poland 86 0.47 Libya 2 0.01 
Lithuania 75 0.41 Marshall Islands 2 0.01 
China 72 0.40 Tunisia 2 0.01 
Canada 66 0.36 Trinidad and Tobago 2 0.01 
Greece 63 0.35 United Arab Emirates 1 0.01 
Slovenia 55 0.30 Bahamas 1 0.01 
Bermuda 48 0.27 Botswana 1 0.01 
India 48 0.27 Belarus 1 0.01 
Cyprus 46 0.25 Dominican Republic 1 0.01 
Estonia 45 0.25 Georgia 1 0.01 
Brazil  42 0.23 Ghana 1 0.01 
Latvia 42 0.23 Liberia 1 0.01 
Iceland 36 0.20 Macedonia 1 0.01 
Hong Kong 35 0.19 Mauritius 1 0.01 
South Africa 35 0.19 Malaysia 1 0.01 
Australia 28 0.15 Peru 1 0.01 
South Korea 28 0.15 Philippines 1 0.01 
Bulgaria 27 0.15 San Marino 1 0.01 
New Zealand 24 0.13 Suriname 1 0.01 
 
Source:  Amadeus dataset provided by Bureau van Dijk. 
84 | Qua rt er ly  Eco no m ic  Comme nt ary  –  S um me r 2 01 6  
 
 
3 Empirical Results  
3.1 All New FDI Projects  
Table 3 shows the estimates from nested logit regressions of determinants of the 
location choice of new foreign affiliates in EU countries over the period 2002-
2013. The first column reports the estimates for all investors while columns 2 and 
3 show the results for EU investors and investors with headquarters outside the 
EU.  
 
The results in column 1 indicate that lower corporate tax rates make EU countries 
more attractive as locations for FDI. Location characteristics that increase 
countries’ attractiveness to FDI over and above the effect of corporate tax rates 
include: market size, market potential (the possibility to access the European 
Single Market from the host country), speaking the same language, and being 
neighbours. GDP per capita captures both production costs and skills. Location 
probabilities are negatively linked to GDP per capita, suggesting that on average, 
the attractiveness of low cost locations dominates the attractiveness of locations 
with high skills.  
 
R&D expenditure intensity has a non-linear effect on the attractiveness of 
countries to FDI. While at low rates of R&D intensity the effect is negative, as the 
R&D intensity increases, this negative effect moderates, and once a threshold has 
been reached, the effect becomes positive. Our estimates indicate that this 
turning point for R&D intensity is 1.8 per cent of GDP.  
 
The dissimilarity parameters (λk) indicate that Ireland and the United Kingdom 
are perceived as being more similar as location options compared with the other 
groups of EU countries considered as location nests. Countries within the 
Southern Europe group and Central and Eastern European countries are more 
similar as location options compared to the Core and Northern group of EU 
countries.  
 
The statistical test for the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) indicates 
that the location options inside the considered groups of countries are not 
independent. This implies that the nested logit estimates are consistent with the 
IIA.  
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TABLE 3 Determinants of the Location Choice for New Foreign Affiliates in EU Countries, 2002-2013 
Explanatory variables  All FDI projects EU 
investors 
Non-EU 
investors 
Corporate tax policy rate -0.083** 0.153*** -0.532*** 
 (0.039) (0.051) (0.056) 
Market size (GDP) 0.345*** 0.362*** 0.346*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.018) 
EU Market potential  0.089*** -0.339*** 0.830*** 
 (0.021) (0.032) (0.034) 
GDP per capita -0.524*** -0.633*** -0.034 
 (0.021) (0.027) (0.053) 
Trade costs- distance to home country  -0.451*** -0.653*** 0.212*** 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.043) 
Common language 0.386*** 0.299*** 0.516*** 
 (0.022) (0.032) (0.039) 
Common border  0.456*** 0.475*** 0.653*** 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.039) 
R&D expenditure intensity  -0.369*** -0.344*** -0.693*** 
 (0.048) (0.064) (0.092) 
R&D expenditure intensity squared 0.103*** 0.066*** 0.224*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.022) 
Dissimilarity parameters (λk)    
United Kingdom and Ireland EU Group 0.444*** 0.564*** 0.267*** 
 (0.022) (0.034) (0.023) 
Core and Northern EU Group 0.637*** 0.731*** 0.465*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) 
Central and Eastern EU Group 0.543*** 0.653*** 0.522*** 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.038) 
Southern EU Group  0.406*** 0.458*** 0.443*** 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.022) 
    
Number of observations 436,846 274,341 162,505 
Log likelihood -47383 -30263 -16211 
LR test for IIA (λk =1) 
 
χ2 (4) = 
917.53*** 
χ2 (4) = 
442.23*** 
χ2 (4) = 
530.38*** 
 
Source:  Authors’ estimates. 
Notes:  Estimates obtained from a nested logit model. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, *, denote p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1, 
respectively. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a foreign affiliate was established over the period in the host country. 
Explanatory variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent variable. R&D expenditure intensity is in 
percentages. Trade costs, common language, common border are dummy variables. The rest of the explanatory variables are 
in logarithms. The country compositions of the EU groups are as follows: Core and Northern: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway. Central and Eastern: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. Southern: Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain.   
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3.2 Intra-EU Investment versus Investment From Outside the EU 
Table 3 also reports results from separate regressions on determinants of the 
location choice of new foreign affiliates in EU countries by companies with 
headquarters in the EU and outside the EU. The evidence suggests that EU and 
non-EU investors value countries’ characteristics differently. FDI by EU investors 
is more likely to locate in countries with higher corporate tax rates where they 
can benefit from local advantages such as low production costs and market size. 
In contrast, investors from outside the EU are deterred by high corporate taxes. 
While low production costs increase the attractiveness of countries to intra-EU 
investment, they do not matter for investors with headquarters outside the EU. 
Other differences in investment behaviour are in relation to the effects of EU 
market access and trade costs. While in the case of investors with headquarters 
outside the EU, the location probability increases with access to the European 
Single Market, intra-EU investments are more likely in countries with small 
market potential. Also, FDI by non-EU investors is more likely in countries which 
are more distant, in which case trade costs would be higher.  
 
Taken together, these results suggest that, in the presence of trade costs, 
countries with a higher EU market potential are particularly attractive to 
investors with headquarters outside the EU. The results also suggest that while 
intra-EU investments are efficiency-seeking, FDI by investors from outside the EU 
are market-seeking.  
 
The dissimilarity parameters indicate that Ireland and the UK are seen as closer 
location alternatives by non-EU investors compared with EU investors. This result 
could be explained by the importance of foreign direct investment in both 
countries by US multinationals. For EU investors, the countries in the Southern EU 
group are seen as closer substitutes compared to other location options in the 
other EU groups.  
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3.3 Differences Across Sectors 
The results shown in Table 4 indicate that foreign investors respond differently to 
corporate taxation in manufacturing and services. On average, FDI in 
manufacturing is more likely to locate in countries with higher corporate tax rates 
where they benefit from other local advantages such as low production costs and 
market size. This result is consistent with the fact that larger countries which are 
more attractive to investment in manufacturing, such as Germany and France, 
tend to have higher corporate tax rates. In contrast, the location probability for 
FDI in services is negatively linked to corporate tax rates.  
 
While on average, higher market potential (access to the European Single 
Market) increases the attractiveness of countries to FDI in services, it does not 
matter for the location choice of FDI in manufacturing.  
 
The dissimilarity parameters indicate that Ireland and the UK are perceived as 
being more similar as location alternatives for FDI in services in comparison to FDI 
in manufacturing.  
 
Table 5 explores heterogeneous effects in investment decisions across both 
investors by country of origin and sectors. The results indicate higher statutory 
corporate tax rates are associated with a higher likelihood of new intra-EU 
investment in manufacturing, while they do not seem to matter for investors 
from outside the EU. Investments from non-EU investors in services are less likely 
in countries with high corporate taxes. The likelihood of investments in 
manufacturing from non-EU investors also declines with the statutory corporate 
tax rate.  
 
Market size increases the likelihood of investment in all analysed cases. The 
different relevance and importance of access to EU markets appears again for EU 
and non-EU investors. While EU investors are likely to invest in countries with a 
smaller EU market potential, countries with a higher EU market potential increase 
substantially the attractiveness to investment by non-EU investors in both 
manufacturing and services.  
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TABLE 4 Determinants of the Location Choice for New Foreign Affiliates in EU Countries, Manufacturing 
and Services, 2002-2013 
Explanatory variables All Investors Manufacturing Services 
Corporate policy tax rate 0.275** -0.216*** 
 (0.129) (0.046) 
Market size (GDP) 0.484*** 0.340*** 
 (0.040) (0.012) 
EU Market potential  0.120 0.161*** 
 (0.077) (0.023) 
GDP per capita -0.969*** -0.399*** 
 (0.072) (0.026) 
Trade costs- distance to home country  -0.444*** -0.430*** 
 (0.051) (0.018) 
Common language 0.468*** 0.322*** 
 (0.076) (0.024) 
Common border  0.468*** 0.524*** 
 (0.064) (0.024) 
R&D expenditure intensity  -0.755*** -0.273*** 
 (0.176) (0.055) 
R&D expenditure intensity squared 0.234*** 0.085*** 
 (0.043) (0.013) 
   
Dissimilarity parameters (λk) 
United Kingdom and Ireland EU Group  0.755*** 0.409*** 
 (0.111) (0.024) 
Core and Northern EU group 0.613*** 0.642*** 
 (0.039) (0.014) 
Central and Eastern EU Group  0.769*** 0.558*** 
 (0.056) (0.020) 
Southern EU Group  0.387*** 0.416*** 
 (0.040) (0.015) 
   
Number of observations 47,193 338,284 
log likelihood -5104 -36579 
LR test for IIA (λk =1) 
χ2 (4) = 
132.34*** 
χ2 (4)= 
704.78*** 
 
Source:  Authors’ estimates. 
Notes:  Estimates obtained from a nested logit model. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, *, denote p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1, 
respectively. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a foreign affiliate was established over the period in the host country. 
Explanatory variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent variable. R&D expenditure intensity is in 
percentages. Trade costs, common language, common border are dummy variables. The rest of the explanatory variables are 
in logarithms. The country compositions of the EU groups are as follows: Core and Northern: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway. Central and Eastern: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. Southern: Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain.  
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TABLE 5 Determinants of the Location Choice for New Foreign Affiliates by EU and non-EU investors in 
Manufacturing and Services, 2002-2013 
Explanatory variables EU Investors  
Non-EU 
Investors  
 Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Services 
Corporate tax policy rate 0.430*** 0.048 0.035 -0.623*** 
 (0.164) (0.059) (0.211) (0.058) 
Market size (GDP) 0.495*** 0.351*** 0.442*** 0.348*** 
 (0.047) (0.015) (0.077) (0.019) 
EU Market potential  -0.326*** -0.278*** 0.832*** 0.892*** 
 (0.111) (0.036) (0.112) (0.038) 
GDP per capita -1.086*** -0.516*** -0.601*** 0.127** 
 (0.091) (0.032) (0.125) (0.063) 
Trade costs- distance to home country  -0.634*** -0.633*** 0.234 0.191*** 
 (0.059) (0.022) (0.157) (0.048) 
Common language 0.337*** 0.256*** 0.699*** 0.415*** 
 (0.106) (0.035) (0.155) (0.042) 
Common border  0.536*** 0.519*** 0.354*** 0.766*** 
 (0.078) (0.029) (0.130) (0.045) 
R&D expenditure intensity  -0.621*** -0.207*** -1.078*** -0.638*** 
 (0.222) (0.074) (0.350) (0.103) 
R&D expenditure intensity squared 0.177*** 0.040** 0.349*** 0.210*** 
 (0.055) (0.018) (0.081) (0.024) 
Dissimilarity parameters (λk)      
United Kingdom and Ireland EU Group 0.722*** 0.541*** 0.636*** 0.246*** 
 (0.139) (0.038) (0.144) (0.024) 
Core and Northern EU Group 0.652*** 0.733*** 0.488*** 0.479*** 
 (0.046) (0.018) (0.072) (0.019) 
Central and Eastern EU Group 0.848*** 0.665*** 0.646*** 0.565*** 
 (0.066) (0.025) (0.128) (0.045) 
Southern EU Group  0.444*** 0.454*** 0.320*** 0.481*** 
 (0.053) (0.061) (0.058) (0.026) 
      
Number of observations 30,144 208,884 17,049 129,400 
log likelihood -3270 -22982 -1736 -12929 
LR test for IIA (λk =1) 
 
χ2 (4) = 
74.38***  
χ2 (4) = 
335.54***  
χ2 (4) = 
 64.15***  
χ2 (4)=  
408.80***  
 
Source:  Authors’ estimates. 
Notes:  Estimates obtained from a nested logit model. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, *, denote p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1, 
respectively. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a foreign affiliate was established over the period in the host country. 
Explanatory variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent variable. R&D expenditure intensity is in 
percentages. Trade costs, common language, common border are dummy variables. The rest of the explanatory variables are 
in logarithms. The country compositions of the EU groups are as follows: Core and Northern: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway. Central and Eastern: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. Southern: Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain. 
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We uncover additional heterogeneous effects with respect to the importance of 
production as well as trade costs. Lower production costs proxied by the GDP per 
capita attract intra-EU investments in both sectors, while in the case of non-EU 
investors, this attractiveness factor appears only for investment in 
manufacturing. Higher levels of GDP per capita increase the attractiveness of EU 
countries to foreign investment by non-EU investors in services. This result might 
be related to higher demand for services in countries with a higher level of 
development.  
 
The dissimilarity parameters indicate that the United Kingdom and Ireland are 
perceived to be more substitutable locations particularly by investors from non-
EU countries and in services.  
  
4 Policy Implications for Ireland 
This section analyses policy implications for Ireland’s attractiveness to FDI on the 
basis of the estimates discussed in Section 3.131 
 
As shown in Table 6, the sensitivity of EU countries’ attractiveness to FDI to 
changes in corporate tax rates is the highest for Southern EU countries. Ireland 
appears to be the 9th most sensitive among EU countries when all FDI projects 
are considered. Assuming all other factors would remain unchanged, a one 
percentage point increase in Ireland’s statutory tax rate (from 12.5 per cent to 
13.5 per cent) would be associated with a reduction of its chance to be chosen as 
a location for new FDI projects by 0.4 per cent.  
 
The sensitivity of Ireland’s attractiveness to changes in corporate tax rates 
appears to be the highest with respect to FDI from non-EU countries and for FDI 
in services. With everything else unchanged, an increase by one percentage point 
in Ireland’s statutory corporate tax rate would reduce the location probability for 
investment from non-EU countries by 4.6 per cent, the highest among EU 
countries, and by 1.2 per cent in the case of FDI in services.  
  
 
                                                          
131  The calculation of the elasticities of location probabilities are based on Greene (2000) and Wen and Koppelman 
(2001). Details are given in Table A2 in the Appendix.  
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TABLE 6 Elasticities of Location Probabilities with respect to Countries’ Own Corporate Tax Rate 
 Countries  All FDI 
projects 
EU investors Non-EU 
investors 
Manufacturing Services 
Malta -0.7222 1.1776 -4.2349 2.5046 -1.8304 
Greece -0.6439 1.0452 -3.7601 2.2163 -1.6223 
Portugal  -0.6222 1.0178 -3.6748 2.1609 -1.5801 
Spain -0.5811 0.9637 -3.4696 2.0197 -1.4863 
Italy -0.4700 0.5876 -2.7894 1.6452 -1.2240 
Slovenia -0.4659 0.7160 -3.1061 1.0953 -1.1802 
Estonia -0.4643 0.7088 -3.0884 1.0860 -1.1720 
Czech Republic -0.4543 0.7068 -3.0532 1.0835 -1.1594 
Ireland -0.4447 0.6506 -4.5753 0.8971 -1.2386 
Croatia -0.4405 0.6774 -2.9432 1.0378 -1.1168 
Luxembourg -0.4391 0.7067 -3.8482 1.5175 -1.1327 
Slovakia -0.4316 0.6703 -2.8953 1.0264 -1.1025 
Norway -0.4264 0.6803 -3.7068 1.4645 -1.0924 
Belgium -0.4209 0.6973 -3.6524 1.4858 -1.0971 
Denmark -0.4177 0.6716 -3.6464 1.4419 -1.0747 
Finland -0.4126 0.6641 -3.5909 1.4175 -1.0627 
Lithuania -0.4102 0.6272 -2.7303 0.9616 -1.0362 
Hungary -0.4069 0.6305 -2.7291 0.9677 -1.0364 
Austria -0.4067 0.6550 -3.5218 1.4063 -1.0433 
Netherlands -0.4059 0.6643 -3.5197 1.4231 -1.0494 
Latvia -0.4042 0.6173 -2.6890 0.9469 -1.0205 
Romania -0.3944 0.5985 -2.6255 0.9126 -0.9945 
France -0.3855 0.6329 -3.2651 1.3238 -0.9886 
Poland -0.3821 0.5965 -2.5911 0.9159 -0.9819 
Germany -0.3577 0.6018 -2.9811 1.2081 -0.9237 
Bulgaria -0.3433 0.5274 -2.2986 0.8061 -0.8715 
United Kingdom -0.2776 0.5089 -2.0170 0.8687 -0.7475 
 
Source:  Authors’ estimates. 
Note:  Elasticities of location probabilities are computed at the country-specific sample means.  
 
Measures to make the UK’s corporate tax rate more competitive have been 
already announced in the Summer Budget in July 2015. Thus, the corporation tax 
rate will be reduced to 19 per cent from 1 April 2017 and 18 per cent from 1 April 
2020. Our results indicate that a reduction by one percentage point of the 
corporate tax rate in the UK (from 20 per cent to 19 per cent) would reduce 
Ireland’s attractiveness to FDI on average by 0.3 per cent. In this scenario, 
Ireland’s probability of being chosen as location for FDI projects would decline by 
4.3 per cent in the case of investors from non-EU countries and by 0.9 per cent in 
the case of FDI in services.  
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Taken together, these research results indicate that a competitive corporate tax 
rate is an important factor for attracting FDI to Ireland, especially from countries 
outside the EU.  
 
From a policy perspective, in the context of increased international tax 
competition, policies aimed at maintaining cost competitiveness and fostering 
further R&D investment would be beneficial for Ireland’s attractiveness to FDI.  
  
5 Summary and Conclusion  
The results of this analysis indicate that, consistent with international evidence, 
on average, lower corporate tax rates increase the attractiveness of countries to 
FDI. However, other location characteristics matter too. Location characteristics 
that increase the attractiveness of EU countries to FDI over and above the effect 
of the corporate tax rate include market size, access to the European Single 
Market, speaking the same language, being neighbours, and having low 
production costs. We uncover a non-linear effect of R&D intensity on the FDI 
location choices. On the one hand, multinational firms tend to locate in countries 
with lower technological development where they benefit from low production 
costs or market size. However, countries with higher levels of technology 
development are also attractive to FDI, the attractiveness factor in this case being 
sourcing advanced research and technologies.  
 
The results also indicate that the effect of corporate taxation on the 
attractiveness of countries to FDI varies depending on economic sectors. It 
appears that lower corporate tax rates increase the attractiveness of EU countries 
to FDI in services while FDI in manufacturing are more likely to locate in larger 
countries such as Germany and France which tend to have higher corporate tax 
rates.  
 
This analysis also shows that given the groups of EU countries considered, EU and 
non-EU investors value location characteristics differently. While FDI by non-EU 
investors is more likely in countries with lower corporate tax rates, intra-EU 
investments are more likely to locate in EU countries with higher corporate taxes 
where they benefit from local advantages such as low production costs and 
market size. Our results indicate that EU investors are seeking low cost locations 
in other EU countries, while investors from outside the EU are attracted by the 
possibility of getting access to the European Single Market.  
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This analysis finds that Ireland and the UK are perceived to be similar as 
alternative locations for FDI in particular by investors from outside the EU and in 
services. This result suggests that a possible redirection of FDI from the UK to 
Ireland would be more likely in the service sector and by investors from outside 
the EU.  
 
A higher corporate tax rate would reduce Ireland’s attractiveness to FDI 
particularly by investors from outside the EU and in services. The sensitivity of 
Ireland’s attractiveness to FDI by investors from outside the EU is the highest 
among EU countries. Our results indicate that, with all other factors unchanged, 
an increase in Ireland’s statutory corporate tax rate by one percentage point 
(from 12.5 per cent to 13.5 per cent) would be associated with a reduction of its 
probability of being chosen as a location for FDI projects from countries outside 
the EU by 4.6 per cent.   
 
A more competitive corporate tax rate in the UK would reduce the attractiveness 
of Ireland particularly for FDI from non-EU countries. With everything else 
unchanged, a reduction of the UK’s corporate tax rate by one percentage point 
(from 20 per cent to 19 per cent) would reduce Ireland’s attractiveness to new 
FDI projects from non-EU countries by 4.3 per cent.   
 
Taken together, our research results indicate that a competitive tax rate is a 
significant factor for attracting FDI to Ireland especially by investors from outside 
the EU.  
 
In the context of increased international tax competition, policies aimed at 
maintaining cost competitiveness and enabling further R&D investment would be 
particularly beneficial for continuing to attract FDI to Ireland.  
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Appendix 
 
TABLE A1 Variables Definitions and Data Sources 
Variable   Definition  Data source 
Location choice  Binary variable equal to 1 if a foreign 
affiliate was established in host country, 0 
otherwise 
Amadeus dataset, Bureau van 
Dijk  
Corporate policy tax rate Statutory corporate tax rate  KPMG 
GDP GDP in 2005 prices  The World Bank, Economy & 
Growth Indicators  
EU Market potential  The sum of GDP in the host country and the 
inverse distance-weighted GDP of all 
location options in the European Union 
other than the host country.  
The World Bank, Economy & 
Growth Indicators, and CEPII  
GDP per capita  GDP in 2005 prices over midyear population 
in host country  
The World Bank, Economy & 
Growth Indicators  
Distance  Distance in km between the host and home 
country capital cities 
CEPII 
Common language  Binary variable equal to 1 if home and host 
countries have a common official primary 
language, 0 otherwise  
CEPII 
Common border  Binary variable equal to 1 if home and host 
countries share a border, 0 otherwise 
CEPII 
R&D expenditure intensity  Public and private R&D expenditure as per 
cent of GDP  
The World Bank, Science & 
Technology Indicators 
 
 
TABLE A2 Direct and Cross-Elasticities of Location Probabilities in Nested Logit Models  
Nested structure  Direct elasticity  Cross-elasticity  
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Notes:  The computation of direct and cross-elasticities of location probabilities with respect to location characteristics X are based 
on Greene (2000) and Wen and Koppelman (2001). Nλ  is the estimated dissimilarity parameter for nest N. iP  is the 
location probability for country i. NiP /  is the location probability for country i conditional on nest N being chosen. NP is 
the location probability for nest N. β  is the estimated parameter for location characteristic .X . 
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